PROJECT WEB DIRECTORY
PAPERS INSTALLED IN THE YEAR 2005 (APPROXIMATELY)
PAPERS 2005 CONTENTS LIST
RETURN TO MAIN COGAFF INDEX FILE
Closely related publications are available at the web site of Matthias Scheutz
This file contains an index to files in the Cognition and Affect Project's FTP/Web directory produced or published in the year 2005. Some of the papers published in this period were produced earlier and are included in one of the lists for an earlier period http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/0-INDEX.html#contents
A list of PhD and MPhil theses was added in June 2003
This file Last updated: 3 Oct 2007
In some cases other versions of the files can be provided on request. Email A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk requesting conversion.
JUMP TO DETAILED LIST (After Contents)
Title: Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism (Originally published in 1974)
Author: Aaron Sloman
Title: 'Ought' and 'Better' (Originally published in 1970)
Author: Aaron Sloman
Title: AI in a New Millennium: Obstacles and Opportunities
Author: Aaron Sloman
Title: Building agents to understand infant attachment behaviour
Author: Dean Petters
Title: The Altricial-Precocial Spectrum for Robots
Authors: Aaron Sloman and Jackie Chappell
Title: Afterthoughts on Analogical Representations (1975)
Author: Aaron Sloman
Filename: sloman-bogey.html
Filename: sloman-bogey.pdf
(incomplete PDF from OCR)
Filename: sloman-bogey-print.pdf
(A more complete, PDF version, derived from the html version.)
Title: Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism
Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 29 Dec 2005
Abstract:
Presented at an interdisciplinary conference on Philosophy of Psychology at the University of Kent in 1971. Published in the proceedings, asA. Sloman, 'Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism'
(along with Reply by G. Mandler and W. Kessen, and additional comments by Alan R. White, Philippa Foot and others, and replies to criticisms)
in Philosophy of Psychology, Ed S.C.Brown, London: Macmillan, 1974, pages 293--304. (Published by Barnes & Noble in USA.)
Commentary and discussion followed on pages 305--348.This paper rehearses some relatively old arguments about how any coherent notion of free will is not only compatible with but depends on determinism.
However the mind-brain identity theory is attacked on the grounds that what makes a physical event an intended action A is that the agent interprets the physical phenomena as doing A. The paper should have referred to the monograph Intention (1957) by Elizabeth Anscombe (summarised here by Jeff Speaks), which discusses in detail the fact that the same physical event can have multiple (true) descriptions, using different ontologies.
My point is partly analogous to Dennett's appeal to the 'intentional stance', though that involves an external observer attributing rationality along with beliefs and desires to the agent. I am adopting the design stance not the intentional stance, for I do not assume rationality in agents with semantic competence (e.g. insects), and I attempt to explain how an agent has to be designed in order to perform intentional actions; the design must allow the agent to interpret physical events (including events in its brain) in a way that is not just perceiving their physical properties. That presupposes semantic competence which is to be explained in terms of how the machine or organism works, i.e. using the design stance, not by simply postulating rationality and assuming beliefs and desires on the basis of external evidence.Some of ideas that were in the paper and in my responses to commentators were also presented in The Computer Revolution in Philosophy, including a version of this diagram (originally pages 344-345, in the discussion section below), discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of the book, and later elaborated as an architectural theory assuming concurrent reactive, deliberative and metamanagement processes, e.g. as explained in this 1999 paper Architecture-Based Conceptions of Mind, and later papers.
The html paper preserves original page divisions.
(I may later add further notes and comments to this HTML version.)
Note added 3 May 2006
I have just found an online review of the whole book here. by Marius Schneider, O. F. M., The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., apparently written in 1975.
Filename: sloman-ought-and-better.html
Filename: ought-better.pdf
Filename:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/ought-and-better-jpegs
(scanned version)
Title: 'Ought' and 'Better'
Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 19 Sep 2005
Abstract:
Originally published as Aaron Sloman, 'Ought and Better' Mind, vol LXXIX, No 315, July 1970, pp 385--394)This is a sequel to the 1969 paper on "How to derive 'Better' from 'Is'" also online at this web site. It presupposes the analysis of 'better' in the earlier paper, and argues that statements using the word 'ought' say something about which of a collection of alternatives is better than the others, in contrast with statements using 'must' or referring to 'obligations', or what is 'obligatory'. The underlying commonality between superficially different statements like 'You should take an umbrella with you' and 'The sun should come out soon' is explained, along with some other philosophical puzzles, e.g. concerning why 'ought' does not imply 'can', contrary to what some philosophers have claimed.
Curiously, the 'Ought' and 'Better' paper is mentioned at http://semantics-online.org/blog/2005/08/ in the section on David Lodge's novel "Thinks...", which includes a reference to this paper 'What to Do If You Want to Go to Harlem: Anankastic Conditionals and Related Matters' by Kai von Fintel and Sabine Iatridou (MIT), which includes a discussion of the paper on 'Ought' and 'Better'.
Filename: sloman-ijcai05-manifesto.pdf
Title: AI in a New Millennium: Obstacles and Opportunities
Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 5 Sep 2005
Abstract:
This paper (a manifesto for long term AI research on integrated,
human-like physically embodied, robots) was originally Section 4 of the
introductory notes for the booklet prepared for the IJCAI-05 Tutorial on
Representation and Learning in Robots and Animals:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/conferences/ijcai-booklet/
A summary of the manifesto was written in July 2005 by Linda world,
available here
Filename: sloman-world-ai-millenium.pdf
Title: AI in a New Millennium: Obstacles and Opportunities
Author: Aaron Sloman
(Paper summarised by Linda World).
Date Installed: 15 Jul 2005
Abstract:
This is a short summary, written by
Linda World, Senior Editor IEEE Computer Society, of
Aaron Sloman's introductory notes for the IJCAI-05 Tutorial
on Representation and Learning in Robots and Animals. See section 4 of
the boolket for the original version:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/conferences/ijcai-booklet/
Linda World also wrote a profile on Aaron Sloman for the 'Histories and Futures' section in the July/Aug 2005 issue of IEEE Intelligent Systems.
Filename: sloman-croucher-warm-heart.pdf
Title: You don't need a soft skin to have a warm heart: Towards a
computational analysis of motives and emotions.
Authors: Aaron Sloman and
Monica Croucher
Originally a Cognitive Science Research Paper at Sussex University:
Sloman, Aaron and Monica Croucher, "You don't need a soft skin to have a warm heart: towards a computational analysis of motives and emotions," CSRP 004, 1981.
Date Installed: 17 Jun 2005 (Written circa 1980-81)
Abstract:
The paper introduces an interdisciplinary methodology for the study of
minds of animals humans and machines, and, by examining some of the
pre-requisites for intelligent decision-making, attempts to provide a
framework for integrating some of the fragmentary studies to be found in
Artificial Intelligence.
The space of possible architectures for intelligent systems is very large. This essay takes steps towards a survey of the space, by examining some environmental and functional constraints, and discussing mechanisms capable of fulfilling them. In particular, we examine a subspace close to the human mind, by illustrating the variety of motives to be expected in a human-like system, and types of processes they can produce in meeting some of the constraints.
This provides a framework for analysing emotions as computational states and processes, and helps to undermine the view that emotions require a special mechanism distinct from cognitive mechanisms. The occurrence of emotions is to be expected in any intelligent robot or organism able to cope with multiple motives in a complex and unpredictable environment.
Analysis of familiar emotion concepts (e.g. anger, embarrassment, elation, disgust, pity, etc.) shows that they involve interactions between motives (e.g. wants, dislikes, ambitions, preferences, ideals, etc.) and beliefs (e.g. beliefs about the fulfilment or violation of a motive), which cause processes produced by other motives (e.g. reasoning, planning, execution) to be disturbed, disrupted or modified in various ways (some of them fruitful). This tendency to disturb or modify other activities seems to be characteristic of all emotions. In order fully to understand the nature of emotions, therefore, we need to understand motives and the types of processes they can produce.
This in turn requires us to understand the global computational architecture of a mind. There are several levels of discussion: description of methodology, the beginning of a survey of possible mental architectures, speculations about the architecture of the human mind, analysis of some emotions as products of the architecture, and some implications for philosophy, education and psychotherapy.
Filename: petters-ijcai05.pdf
Title: Building agents to understand infant attachment behaviour
Author: Dean Petters
(School of Computer Science,
University of Birmingham)
Paper for the Modeling Natural Action Selection workshop at IJCAI 2005 in Edinburgh, July 30-31st
Date Installed: 8 Jun 2005
Abstract:
This paper reports on an autonomous agent simulation of infant
attachment behaviour. The behaviours simulated have been observed in
home environments and in a controlled laboratory procedure called the
Strange Situation Experiment. The Avoidant, Secure and Ambivalent styles
of be- haviour seen in these studies are outlined, and then abstracted
to their core elements to act as a specification of requirements for the
simulation. A reactive agent architecture demonstrates that these
patterns of behaviour can be learnt from reinforcement signals without
recourse to deliberative mechanisms.
For background see http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~ddp/
Filename: summary-gc7.pdf
Title: Altricial self-organising information-processing systems
Abstract for International Workshop on The Grand Challenge in Non-Classical Computation 18-19th April 2005, York, UK
Authors: Aaron Sloman
and
Jackie Chappell
(School of Biosciences
University of Birmingham)
Date: 14 Apr 2005
Abstract:
It is often thought that there is one key design principle or at best a
small set of design principles, underlying the success of biological
organisms. Candidates include neural nets, `swarm intelligence',
evolutionary computation, dynamical systems, particular types of
architecture or use of a powerful uniform learning mechanism, e.g.
reinforcement learning. All of those support types of self-organising,
self-modifying behaviours. But we are nowhere near understanding the
full variety of powerful information-processing principles `discovered'
by evolution. By attending closely to the diversity of biological
phenomena we may gain key insights into (a) how evolution happens, (b)
what sorts of mechanisms, forms of representation, types of learning and
development and types of architectures have evolved, (c) how to explain
ill-understood aspects of human and animal intelligence, and (d) new
useful mechanisms for artificial systems.
Filename: alt-prec-ijcai05.pdf
Title: The Altricial-Precocial Spectrum for Robots
In Proceedings IJCAI-05, pages 1187--1192, Edinburgh
Authors: Aaron Sloman
and
Jackie Chappell
(School of Biosciences
University of Birmingham)
Date: 14 Apr 2005
Abstract:
Several high level methodological debates among
AI researchers, linguists, psychologists and
philosophers, appear to be endless, e.g. about
the need for and nature of representations,
about the role of symbolic processes, about
embodiment, about situatedness, about whether
symbol-grounding is needed, and about whether
a robot needs any knowledge at birth or can start
simply with a powerful learning mechanism.
Consideration of the variety of capabilities and
development patterns on the precocial-altricial
spectrum in biological organisms will help us to
see these debates in a new light.
It seems that after evolution discovered how to make physical bodies that grow themselves, it discovered how to make virtual machines that grow themselves. Researchers attempting to design human-like, chimp-like or crow-like intelligent robots will need to understand how. Whether computers as we know them can provide the infrastructure for such systems is a separate question.
Filename: sloman-afterthoughts.pdf
Filename: sloman-tinlap-1975.pdf
(original formatting: also
here)
Title: Afterthoughts on Analogical Representations (1975)
(Derived from a scanned version)
Originally Published in
in
Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing (TINLAP-1),
Eds. R. Schank & B. Nash-Webber,
pp. 431--439,
MIT,
Now available online
http://acl.ldc.upenn.edu/T/T75/
Reprinted in
Readings in knowledge representation,
Eds. R.J. Brachman & H.J. Levesque,
Morgan Kaufmann,
1985.
Author: Aaron Sloman
Date installed: 28 Mar 2005
Abstract:
In 1971 I wrote
a paper
attempting to relate some old philosophical
issues about representation and reasoning to problems in Artificial
Intelligence. A major theme of the paper was the importance of
distinguishing ``analogical'' from ``Fregean'' representations. I still
think the distinction is important, though perhaps not as important for
current problems in A.I. as I used to think. In this paper I'll try to
explain why.
See also the School of Computer Science Web page.
This file is maintained by
Aaron Sloman, and designed to be
lynx-friendly,
and
viewable with any browser.
Email A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk
