THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
School of Computer Science
THE COGNITION AND AFFECT PROJECT

PROJECT WEB DIRECTORY
PAPERS ADDED IN THE YEAR 2011 (APPROXIMATELY)

PAPERS 2011 CONTENTS LIST
RETURN TO MAIN COGAFF INDEX FILE

NOTE

This file is http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/11.html
Maintained by Aaron Sloman -- who does not respond to Facebook requests. It contains an index to files in the Cognition and Affect Project's FTP/Web directory produced or published in the year 2011. Some of the papers published in this period were produced earlier and are included in one of the lists for an earlier period. Some older papers recently digitised may also be included. http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/0-INDEX.html#contents

A list of PhD and MPhil theses was added in June 2003

This file Last updated: 6 Mar 2011; 6 Jun 2011; 18 Jul 2011; 1 Mar 2012; 2 Jun 2012; 7 Jul 2012; 21 Oct 2012; 24 Oct 2012; 6 Dec 2014;


PAPERS (AND TALKS) IN THE COGNITION AND AFFECT DIRECTORY
Produced or published in 2011 (Approximately)
(Latest first)

Most of the papers listed here are in postscript and PDF format. More recent papers are in PDF only. A few are html only.


The following Contents list (in reverse chronological order) contains links to locations in this file giving further details, including abstracts, and links to the papers themselves.

JUMP TO DETAILED LIST (After Contents)

CONTENTS -- FILES 2011 (Latest First)

What follows is a list of links to more detailed information about each paper. From there you can select the actual papers, in various formats, e.g. PDF, postscript and some in html.


DETAILS OF FILES AVAILABLE


BACK TO CONTENTS LIST

Filename: sloman-meaning-bearers.html
Filename: sloman-meaning-bearers.pdf
Title: Meaning-bearers in Computers, Brains, and Natural or Artificial Minds

Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 28 Oct 2012

Where published:


in AMD Newsletter Vol. 8, No. 1, 2011 (pages: 6--7)
http://www.cse.msu.edu/amdtc/amdnl/AMDNL-V8-N1.pdf

Response to:

Dialog Column
Are Natural Languages Symbolic in the Brain? by Juyang Weng

Abstract:

Since perceptual and other contents must change faster than physical parts of brains can be rearranged (e.g. walking with eyes open in a busy city), biological minds need VMs. That can include symbols, for example if you solve equations in your head, rehearse a Shakespearean sonnet, or wonder how brains work. Brain-based VMs can also construct and manipulate diagrams, e.g. visualising the Chinese proof of Pythagoras' theorem, or designing a new information-processing architecture, or imagining the operation of a threaded bolt rotating as it goes into a nut. Virtual machinery includes, but is not restricted to, discrete, discontinuous, structures and processes. Interacting VMs on computers and attached devices run concurrently -- their state being preserved in memory while CPUs switch tasks, relying on decades of complex design by hardware and software engineers, solving many different problems, including self-monitoring and control. Very few grasp the big picture combining their efforts.

Biological evolution did something similar, though far more complex and difficult to understand. Support for VMs used in human language, in construction of percepts, in formation of motives, in specifying actions, in generating, evaluating and executing plans, and learning, probably took thousands of intermediate design steps, not yet known to us. Clues exist in the competences of other animals and in pre-verbal children (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Exactly what the VMs are, how they evolved, how they are implemented in brains and what their functions are, are still unanswered questions. We cannot find answers simply by studying a narrow subset of products of evolution (e.g. humans) nor a narrow class of robots that mimic some tiny (often arbitrary) subset of animal competence.


Now moved to http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/12.html#1202
Title: John McCarthy - Some Reminiscences

Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 8 Dec 2011


File: HTML
File: PDF
Title: A Machine's Hope

Author: Jeremiah Via
Web site: http://jeremiahvia.com/
Date Installed: 9 Oct 2011

Where published:

This was a student essay written as part of the undergraduate degree in Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science in the School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/


Four Papers for: Alan Turing - His Work and Impact
Editors: S Barry Cooper and Jan van Leeuwen
Date: Published July 2013: Contents List
Note: The copy-editing of this book illustrated my complaints about publishers' copy-editors here. I asked for many "corrections" to be undone, but had no control over the final stages of the process. So I'll put my definitive final versions here.
I thank Barry Cooper for helping with the battle against Elsevier and ensuring high quality of the final version of the book.
Ideas in the fourth paper are developed further in The Meta-Morphogenesis Project


Filename: sloman-understand-symbols.pdf
Title: What Sorts Of Machines Can Understand The Symbols They Use?

Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 29 Aug 2011 (Published July 1986)

Where published:

Invited contribution:
Joint Session of Mind Association and Aristotelian Society July 1986
Reply was presented by L.Jonathan Cohen, Oxford.
Published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume LX, 1986 pages 61--80,
Stable URL, including reply by Cohen: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106898

Abstract: (Partial extract from text)

My topic is a specialised variant of the old philosophical question `could a machine think?'. Some say it is only a matter of time before computer-based artefacts will behave as if they had thoughts and perhaps even feelings, pains or any other occupants of the human mind, conscious or unconscious. I shall not pre-judge this issue. The space of possible computing systems is so vast, and we have explored such a tiny corner, that it would be as rash to pronounce on what we may or may not discover in our future explorations as to predict what might or might not be expressible in print shortly after its invention. Instead I'll merely try to clarify what we might look for.
Like Searle ([11,12]) I'll focus on a specific type of thought, namely understanding symbols. Clearly, artefacts like card-sorters, optical character readers, voice-controlled machines, and automatic translators, manipulate symbols. Do they understand the symbols? Some machines behave as if they do, at least in a primitive way. They respond to commands by performing tasks; they print out answers to questions; they paraphrase stories or answer questions about them. We understand the symbols, but do THEY?

A `design stance' helps to clarify the question whether machines themselves can understand symbols in a non-derivative way. It is not enough that machines appear from the outside to mimic human understanding: there must be a reliable basis for assuming that they can display understanding in an open-ended range of situations, not all anticipated by the programmer. I have briefly described structural and functional design requirements for this, and argued that even the simplest computers use symbols in such a manner that the machines themselves associate meanings of a primitive sort with them.

I have shown that a computer may use symbols to refer to its own internal states and to abstract objects; and indicated how it might refer to a world to which it has only limited access, relying on the use of axiom-systems or perception-action loops to constrain possible interpretations. These constraints leave meanings partly indeterminate and indefinitely extendable. Causal links reduce but do not remove indeterminacy.

The full range of meaningful uses of symbols by human beings requires a type of architectural complexity not yet achieved in AI systems.

There is a complex set of prototypical conditions for understanding, different subsets of which may be exemplified in different animals or machines, yielding a large space of possible systems which we are only just beginning to explore. Our ordinary labels are not suited to drawing a definite global boundary within such a space. At best we can analyse the implications of many different boundaries, all very important. This requires a long term multi-disciplinary exploration.


Filename: sloman-comments-on-grush.pdf
Title: Comments on "The Emulating Interview... with Rick Grush"

Pre-print of a paper in the online journal AVANT, The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard,
commenting on a report on Rick Grush being interviewed by Przemyslaw Nowakowski in:
The Emulating Interview pp 213--224 (English version), 2011.

Author: Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 8 Jun 2011

Where published:

This is a pre-print of that appeared in AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
http://avant.edu.pl/en/ -- An Open Access Online Polish-English Journal

Abstract:

This is a response to some parts of the Grush interview by Przemyslaw Nowakowski published here:
http://www.avant.umk.pl/en/2010/11/the-emulating-interview...-with-rick-grush/

My views are very close to those expressed by Rick Grush, but I think some of the things he says are misleading. I don't know whether that is because he simply has not expressed himself clearly, or because what he meant to say really is different from what I think he should have said, or because I misinterpreted what he wrote. I hope these comments will turn out to be clarifications rather than criticisms.


Filename: sloman-sps-2011.pdf (DRAFT)
Title: Evolution of mind as a feat of computer systems engineering: Lessons from decades of development of self-monitoring virtual machinery.

Author:Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 6 Jun 2011 Updated: 11 Jun 2011 (added anti-zombie argument); 16 Jul 2011 (minor changes)

Slides for talk: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#sps11

Presented at the following conference. Will be published in French with commentaries in The "Philosophy of science" series of http://www.vuibert.fr/
A Preprint of this paper was published (with a brief commentary, by Marcin Milkowski) in English and Polish
with title "Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds"
in the open access Polish student philosophy journal http://avant.edu.pl/en/issues/ in issue 2011-2 http://avant.edu.pl/en/22011-2/

Presented at: Pierre Duhem Conference
Nancy France, Tuesday 19th July 2011 Co-located with CLMP 2011: 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Nancy, July 19-26, 2011

I regret I am unable to translate the following reliably:
http://www.sps-philoscience.org/activites/activite.php?id=15
V. conférences de Clark Glymour et Aaron Sloman
Le Mardi 19 juillet 2011, 09:00 à 13:00

Présentation des conférences Duhem.
La Société de Philosophie des Sciences (SPS) organise chaque année des conférences publiques, intitulées "Conférences Pierre Duhem" qu'elle confie à des chercheurs confirmés qui comptent ou non parmi ses membres. Les conférenciers exposent un travail original qui entre dans l'un des domaines de spécialité que couvre statutairement la SPS. Ils s'appuient sur un texte inédit. Le texte des conférences (et des commentaires) est ensuite publié.

Pour l'année 2011, la SPS a souhaité organiser ces conférences à Nancy dans le cadre du congrès CLMPS comme symposium affilié afin de permettre à un maximum de personnes d'y assister. Ces conférences ont de plus été organisées en collaboration avec le Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), qui fournit deux des répondants aux conférenciers.

Thème : philosophie de l'intelligence artificielle
Date : mardi 19 juillet, à Nancy
Lieu : voir le programme détaillé du CLMPS
Conférenciers invités : Clark Glymour (Carnegie Mellon University) & Aaron Sloman (université de Birmingham)
Organisation : Max Kistler (président du comité scientifique) et Cyrille Imbert (Archives Poincaré, Nancy)
Discutants : Isabelle Drouet (IHPST), Jean-Paul Haton (LORIA, Nancy), Philippe de Groote (LORIA, Nancy), Matteo Mossio (Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Spain).

Les conférences sont organisées avec le soutien du LORIA, de l'IHPST et de la MSH Lorraine.

Abstract:

What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin's opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which we have only recently learnt how to design and build, and could not even have been thought about in Darwin's time, can interact with the physical machinery in which they are implemented, without being identical with their physical implementation, nor mere aggregates of physical structures and processes. The existence of various kinds of virtual machinery (including both "platform" virtual machines that can host other virtual machines, e.g. operating systems, and "application" virtual machines, e.g. spelling checkers, and computer games) depends on complex webs of causal connections involving hardware and software structures, events and processes, where the specification of such causal webs requires concepts that cannot be defined in terms of concepts of the physical sciences. (e.g. concepts like "winning a game", "pawn", "defend", "illegal access", "spelling error", and also "desire", "belief", "preference", "learning", "remembering", and others). That indefinability, plus the possibility of various kinds of self-monitoring within virtual machinery, seems to explain some of the allegedly mysterious and irreducible features of consciousness that motivated Darwin's critics and also more recent philosophers criticising AI. There are consequences for philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and robotics.

Keywords: Architecture, Causation, Cognition, Consciousness, Control, Darwin, Designer Stance, Downward Causation, Evolution, Explanatory Gap, Huxley, Layers, Mind, Self-monitoring, Universal Turing machine, Virtual Machine Supervenience, Virtual Machinery

See also:
Virtual Machines in Philosophy, Engineering & Biology (2008)
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/08.html#803

What Cognitive Scientists Need to Know about Virtual Machines
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/09.html#901

Virtual Machines and the Metaphysics of Science
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#mos09

How Virtual Machinery Can Bridge the "Explanatory Gap", In Natural and Artificial Systems
in Proceedings SAB 2010
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/10.html#sab

Various PDF presentations on virtual machinery, supervenience, and consciousness
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk84
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk86
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk85
(Dennett on virtual machines.)

What are virtual machines? Are they real? (PDF Seminar Slides, 2000)
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/00-02.html#65

With Ron Chrisley: Virtual machines and consciousness (JCS 2003)
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/03.html#200302


Filename: sloman-ijcai83-meaning.pdf
Title: Introduction to Panel Discussion: Under What Conditions Can A Machine Attribute Meanings To Symbols?

Authors: Aaron Sloman et al.,
Date Installed: 23 Mar 2011 (Published 1983)

Where published:

 @Inproceedings
 {sloman:83b,
 author = "Aaron Sloman and Drew V. McDermott and William A. Woods and Brian
Cantwell Smith
     and Patrick J. Hayes",
 title = "Panel discussion: Under What Conditions Can a Machine Attribute
Meanings to Symbols?",
 booktitle = "Proceedings IJCAI'83",
 pages = {44-48},
 year = {1983},
 url ={http://ijcai.org/Past%20Proceedings/IJCAI-83-VOL-1/CONTENT/content.htm},
}



Filename: sloman-evo-devo.pdf
Title: Evolved Cognition and Artificial Cognition:
Some Genetic/Epigenetic Trade-offs for Organisms and Robots

Author:Aaron Sloman
Date Installed: 6 Mar 2011

Where published:

Draft -- In preparation.

Abstract:

Some researchers assume that a machine can acquire human-like intelligence if it initially has (a) a large but empty information store, (b) a very powerful general-purpose learning mechanism, (c) a rich environment in which to learn, and possibly also (d) a teacher to guide the learning; with learning occurring at speeds comparable to learning in humans, rather than requiring evolutionary time-scales, despite the absence of any specific innate knowledge about the environment initially, nor any innate concepts (an ontology) specific to the environment. This assumption is closely related to the ancient empiricist "tabula rasa" theory of knowledge acquisition. That theory can be contrasted with alternative hypotheses regarding starting points for various kinds of learning about the world in diverse animals and, by implication, future intelligent robots, including the approach proposed in (McCarthy, 2008), making use of a Design-based, environmentally informed, nativist meta-knowledge theory. An extended version of McCarthy's approach, applied across species, can lead to deeper and more powerful explanatory theories of information processing in organisms than the alternatives, and can also provide new ideas about both requirements for future intelligent machines and also possible new designs, linking AI and Biology in new ways.

(To be expanded).

See also http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#piaget
Talk 90: Piaget (and collaborators) on Possibility and Necessity And the relevance of/to AI/Robotics



BACK TO CONTENTS LIST


NOTE


Older files in this directory (pre 2011) are accessible via the main index


RETURN TO MAIN COGAFF INDEX FILE

See also the School of Computer Science Web page.

This file is maintained by Aaron Sloman, and designed to be lynx-friendly, and viewable with any browser.
Email A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk