School of Computer Science THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM Ghost Machine

WARNING: UNFINISHED DRAFT

THE COGAFF PROJECT
Papers and presentations on affect, in the Birmingham Cognition and Affect Project started here in 1991, building on earlier work at Sussex University.

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Other papers and presentations more concerned with non-affective aspects,
e.g. perception, reasoning, learning are included in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/
with talks/presentations here
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/

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This document is available in two formats:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/emotions-affect.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/emotions-affect.pdf
(DRAFT: Liable to change)

Aaron Sloman
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham


LATEST NEWS:
28 Jan 2019:
A talk on computer emotions by Matilde Aliffi and Helen Ryland
(Abstract and slides below)


What is this?

This (still incomplete) document lists some of the papers written at the University of Birmingham (1991 onwards), mainly within the Cognition and Affect (CogAff) project, concerned with a general framework for combining affective mechanisms (involved in wants, hopes, fears, likes, dislikes, emotions, moods, evaluations, ...etc...etc.) with cognitive phenomena (e.g. perceiving, acting, planning, learning, predicting, explaining, learning, hypothesizing, ...etc...etc.)

From its early days the project was committed to a theoretical-comparative approach, i.e. studying not only phenomena that occur in humans, or in humans and other animals, but to a study of the space of possible designs (especially possible information processing architectures) for systems capable of having informational states and processes (involving desires, preferences, values, moods, beliefs, skills, knowledge, uncertainty, etc.) as well as having physical states and processes (including body form, actions available, sensors, motors, internal physiological systems, size, shape, weight, changing physical needs and stored resources, etc.), in various environments (e.g. under water, on land, both, on flat terrain, in various types of non-flat environment (e.g. mountain slopes, etc.), with various ranges of temperature, resource availability, threats and dangers, etc.

This contrasts strongly both with shallow theories of embodied, enactive, expressive ("skin deep"??) aspects of affective states and processes, and utility-based theories of motivation, and also with informationally-restricted theories, e.g. assuming that all information and information processing is logical, or symbolic, or probability-based, or restricted in some other way (as happened at various stages in the history of AI). The emphasis on designs and what they can and cannot do also contrasts with a focus on classifying and correlating measurable, or observable or introspectable or physiological states of humans or other species. The CogAff approach to the study of the space of possible minds and possible mind-based states and processes aims to bring about a change in science that is partly similar to how the periodic table of the elements initiated deep changes in chemistry. Unfortunately, most researchers on cognition and affect are not educated with the required attitudes, concepts, knowledge and skills, e.g. abilities to design, build, test, and debug working models.

The list below also includes some relevant earlier papers from my days (pre-1991) at Sussex University (1962-91).


Who knows what?
Great poets, playwrights, novelists and composers often have a much deeper understanding of varieties of affect than (current) philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and cognitive modellers. But their deep understanding is implicit and usually only indirectly articulated, e.g. in plot construction, dialogue construction, thought-streams, musical compositions, etc.

One goal for AI is to find ways to make that implicit knowledge explicit and demonstrate the implications by building a succession of increasingly realistic, increasingly complex, working systems. But "working" does not merely mean showing behaviours (including linguistic behaviours) thought to correspond to various cognitive and affective states and processes. There must also be the right kinds in internal/invisible information processing including forms of reasoning, clashes of motivation, resolution of conflicts, growth and modification of attitudes and values, etc.

A full model should include "genetic time-bombs" i.e. potential at various late stages of development to produce new motives, values, preferences, abilities, etc. In humans the motivational (and consequential emotional) changes at puberty are obvious examples. But genetic time-bombs may have even longer fuses concerned with how to use a large volume of acquired knowledge, skills, experience, etc. after enough time has been spent on acquisition. (The corresponding mechanisms in humans seem to be highly erratic, and often over-ridden by self-interested motivation.)

NOTE:
Beware of arguments purporting to prove that "AI systems (including robots) can't do X" by proving that "Computers can't do X".

They are as valid as arguments showing that "Molecules can't do Y (e.g. have emotions, or discover geometric theorems), therefore objects composed of molecules can't do Y".

Turing machines, are irrelevant to AI for reasons explained in this paper:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/00-02.html#77

On the other hand complex systems composed of large numbers of interconnected digital computers, sensors and motors, in a machine located in a complex, changing, partly unpredictable environment, are another matter. (As H.A. Simon pointed out in "Motivational and emotional controls of cognition", 1967.)

The deep, still unanswered, question is: what sort of (self-extending) information-processing architecture could replicate the required functionality in future machines?

The answer may be related to the question whether sub-neuronal molecular computations are essential to biological competences of poets, playwrights, squirrels defeating squirrel-proof bird-feeders, and ancient mathematicians.

Clearly some motives e.g. hunger, are based on molecular processes. Perhaps far more aspects of mentality are than we realise. I have raised that question in connection with ancient spatial reasoning abilities underlying discoveries in geometry and topology, here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/kant-maths.html
Key Aspects of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics
(That's a companion-piece to a discussion of Turing's distinction in his PhD thesis between mathematical intuition and mathematical ingenuity: he suggested that computers could replicate the latter but not the former.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/turing-intuition.html

Some incomplete remarks on requirements for types of computer capable of replicating spatial reasoning in humans and other intelligent animals:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/super-turing-geom.html


Installed: 11 Mar 2018
Last updated: 20 Jan 2019; 7 Feb 2019
27 May 2018; 19 Aug 2018; 2 Oct 2018; 24 Oct 2018;
More papers still to be included, annotated, etc.
This paper is
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/emotions-affect.html
This is part of the Birmingham Cognition and Affect (COGAFF) project:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/


LATEST NEWS

On Monday 28 January 2019, two researchers in the School of Philosophy gave a talk in the School of Computer Science, on
Robots, Emotions, and Epistemic Rational Assessability
Slides for the talk: PDF with linked videos Rationality_Robot_emotions.pdf
Speakers: Matilde Aliffi and Helen Ryland
https://vpp.midlands3cities.ac.uk/display/mxa654bhamacuk/
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/ptr/departments/philosophy/research/postgraduateresearch/profiles/ryland-helen.aspx
(Both doctoral Researchers, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham)
Abstract:
There is a current lack of philosophical research on whether robots could have emotions. In this talk, we argue that the idea that a robot could have emotions is more plausible than currently assumed. We will demonstrate this by giving examples of robots that appear to have some of the emotional components that are usually involved in human emotional experiences. This opens up new philosophical questions specifically about the rational status of these robots? emotions. We claim that if a robot can have emotions, or ?robot-like emotions?, then these emotions may be open to epistemic rational assessment.


MAIN CONTENTS
Papers and notes on the Cognition and Affect Project

Related work done since mid 1960s, including later work with students and colleagues.
This work was first influenced by AI during 1972-3, when I spent a year in Edinburgh, having my brain rewired, for a new approach to philosophy.
(This list is still incomplete.)
External summaries
Here's a very short summary, with diagrams, of the H-Cogaff architecture schema, produced by someone I've never met
http://www.garfixia.nl/h-cogaff

INCOMPLETE CONTENTS LIST
(To be expanded)
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Early papers relevant to emotions/motivation/affect/preferences/values...
1969
How to derive "better" from "is"
Sloman
1970
"Ought" and "Better"
Sloman
1978
1978 Book: The Computer Revolution in Philosophy
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Papers more centrally concerned with varieties of affect
1981
You don't need a soft skin to have a warm heart
Sloman and Croucher
1981
Why robots will have emotions
Sloman and Croucher
1982
Towards a Grammar of Emotions
Sloman
1987
Motives Mechanisms and Emotions
Sloman
1990
Prolegomena to a Theory of Communication and Affect
Sloman
1991
A Proposal for a Study of Motive Processing
Luc Beaudoin (Thesis proposal)
1992
Appendix to JCI proposal, The Attention and Affect Project
Sloman and Humphreys
This paper was mostly written by the first author, although it is partly based on, and develops, ideas of the second author.
1992
What are the phenomena to be explained?
Sloman
1992 Towards an information processing theory of emotions
Sloman
1992
Silicon Souls, How to design a functioning mind
Sloman
(Professorial Inaugural Lecture, University of Birmingham 1992)
1993
The mind as a control system
Sloman
1993
A study of motive processing and attention,
Beaudoin and Sloman (April 1993)
1993
The Terminological Pitfalls of Studying Emotion
Tim Read
1994
Computational Modelling Of Motive-Management Processes
Sloman, Beaudoin, Wright ISRE 1994 Poster
1994
Goal processing in autonomous agents
Luc Beaudoin (PhD thesis)
1994
An Emotional Agent -- Detection and Control of Emergent States in an Autonomous Resource-Bounded Agent
Ian Wright (Thesis proposal)
1995
Information about the SimAgent toolkit
Aaron Sloman and Riccardo Poli (later Brian Logan)
1995
Playing God: A toolkit for building agents
     Information about the SimAgent toolkit
Aaron Sloman and Riccardo Poli
Date: November 1994 to March 1995
1995
SIM_AGENT: A toolkit for exploring agent designs
Aaron Sloman and Riccardo Poli
1996
Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes,
(Grief paper.)
Ian P. Wright, Aaron Sloman, Luc P. Beaudoin,
1998
Cognition and affect: Architectures and tools
Brian Logan and Aaron Sloman
1998
Architectures and Tools for Human-Like Agents
Aaron Sloman and Brian Logan
1999
PhD Thesis Proposal: Distributed Reflective Architectures,
Catriona M. Kennedy
1999
Patrice Terrier interviews Aaron Sloman for EACE QUARTERLY
(August 1999)
1999
Title: Architectural Requirements for Human-like Agents Both Natural and Artificial.
(What sorts of machines can love? )

Aaron Sloman. Invited conference talk, later published in Human Cognition And Social Agent Technology
Ed. Kerstin Dautenhahn,
1999
How many separately evolved emotional beasties live within us?
Aaron Sloman
Invited Talk: at workshop on Emotions in Humans and Artifacts Vienna, August 1999
Final version published 2002.
1999-2000
Evolvable architectures for human-like minds
Aaron Sloman and Brian Logan
Invited talk at 13th Toyota Conference, on "Affective Minds" Nagoya Japan, Nov-Dec 1999
Published in Affective Minds, Ed. Giyoo Hatano, Elsevier, October 2000
2003
Progress report on the Cognition and Affect project:
Architectures, Architecture-Schemas, And The New Science of Mind
Aaron Sloman
2004
AAAI 2004 Workshop invited talk: What are emotion theories about?
Aaron Sloman
2004
Simulating Infant-Carer Relationship Dynamics
Dean Petters
2004
How to Determine the Utility of Emotions (At AAAI-04)
Matthias Scheutz
2005
The Architectural Basis of Affective States and Processes
Sloman, Chrisley and Scheutz: invited book chapter for "Who needs emotions" (eds. Arbib and Fellous).
2009
Architecture-Based Motivation vs Reward-Based Motivation
Strongly challenges almost all published theories of motivation, especially in experimental psychology, neuroscience, and AI, and some in philosophy. They all grossly over-simplify the biological facts.
Aaron Sloman
2017
Architectures underlying cognition and affect in natural and artificial systems
(Extended Abstract for invited talk at AISB 2017)
2017
Cognition and Affect: Past and Future
Cognition and Affect Workshop, Following AISB 2017 Discussions.
University of Birmingham, 24th April 2017
2017
Anger, an example of conceptual analysis,
(Background material for workshop)
Aaron Sloman
MORE TO BE ADDED
REFERENCES AND LINKS
BACK TO CONTENTS
Early papers relevant to emotions/motivation/affect/preferences/values...

REFERENCES AND LINKS


A partial index of discussion notes in this directory is in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/AREADME.html

Maintained by Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science
The University of Birmingham