School of Computer Science THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

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And especially Sally Rumsey (ORA Service & Development Manager)

The PDF files listed below were downloaded from Oxford Research Archive
(This was the first Oxford DPhil Thesis to be digitised for the archive.)
Unfortunately, the archive is often extremely slow to respond. (Not any more 6 Jan 2010)

Updated 22 Aug 2009: Fixed link to Oxford Research Archive.

Updated 8 Jan 2008:
Added more information about the contents of Appendices III and IV, including links to some of my more recent work on those topics.

Updated 10 Jun 2007:
Slight reformatting, and added full table of contents copied from the PDF version.


Oxford University Thesis

Aaron Sloman: Knowing and Understanding (1962)

Relations between meaning and truth, meaning and necessary truth, meaning and synthetic necessary truth

Abstract
The avowed aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. (Not all kinds of meaning are concerned with truth.) After the preliminaries (chapter one), in which the problem is stated and some methodological remarks made, the investigation proceeds in two stages. First there is a detailed inquiry into the manner in which the meanings or functions of words occurring in a statement help to determine the conditions in which that statement would be true (or false). This prepares the way for the second stage, which is an inquiry concerning the connection between meaning and necessary truth (between understanding and knowing apriori). The first stage occupies Part Two of the thesis, the second stage Part Three. In all this, only a restricted class of statements is discussed, namely those which contain nothing but logical words and descriptive words, such as "Not all round tables are scarlet" and "Every three-sided figure is three-angled". (The reasons for not discussing proper names and other singular definite referring expressions are given in Appendix I.)
NOTE:
This web page is loosely based on the corresponding ORA web page, though I have added a table of contents, which would otherwise be available only in one of the PDF files.

I have also begun to add additional information about some of the contents, since the PDF files are not searchable.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Sizes of PDF files are given below.
They have not been converted to searchable text.)

Title page,
Abstract, ---------------------------------- PDF
Preface and Acknowledgements --- PDF (includes Chapter one)

Part or Chapter Title Page Link to PDF file
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ---------------------------
PART ONE: SOME PRELIMINARIES
Chapter one: Introduction . . 1 . . .PDF (includes Preface)
..... 1.A. The problems . . 1
..... 1.B. Methodological remarks . . 5
..... 1.C. The programme . 13
-
PART TWO: MEANING AND TRUTH
Chapter two: Propositions and meanings . 18 . . .PDF
..... 2.A. Criteria of identity . 18
..... 2.B. General facts about language . 24
..... 2.C. Universals and strict criteria . 38
..... 2.D. The independence of universals . 50
-
Chapter three: Semantic rules . 63 . . .PDF
..... Introduction . 63
..... 3.A. F-words . 64
..... 3.B. Logical syntheses . 70
..... 3.C. How properties explain . 83
..... 3.D. Non-logical syntheses . 93
..... 3.E. Concluding remarks and qualifications 102
-
Chapter four: Semantic rules and living languages 107 . . .PDF
..... 4.A. Indefiniteness 107
..... 4.B. Ordinary language works 117
..... 4.C. Purely verbal rules 125
-
Chapter five: Logical form and logical truth 129 . . .PDF
..... Introduction 129
..... 5.A. Logic and syntax 130
..... 5.B. Logical techniques 144
..... 5.C. Logical Truth 166
..... 5.D. Some generalisations 176
..... 5.E. Conclusions and qualifications 181
-
PART THREE: MEANING AND NECESSARY TRUTH
Chapter six: Analytic propositions 194 . . .PDF
..... 6.A. Introduction 194
..... 6.B. Some unsatisfactory accounts of the distinction 199
..... 6.C. Identifying relations between meanings 217
..... 6.D. Indefiniteness of meaning 229
..... 6.E. Knowledge of analytic truth 236
..... 6.F. Concluding remarks 249
-
Chapter seven: Kinds of necessary truth 260 . . .PDF
..... Introduction 260
..... 7.A. Possibility 261
..... 7.B. Necessity 272
..... 7.C. Synthetic necessary connections 283
..... 7.D. Informal proofs 294
..... 7.E. Additional remarks 319
-
Chapter eight: Concluding summary 329 . . .PDF
-
APPENDICES 335 . . .PDF
..... . . I. Singular referring expressions 335
..... .. II. Confusions of formal logicians 340
This appendix presents arguments against the view that a natural language must include a formal system, and that logic is just a matter of syntax. One of the key points, also made by Frege, is that semantics cannot emerge from syntax alone: we also need to take account of the functions of the symbols used, not just their form.
..... . III. Implicit knowledge 357
This appendix gives examples of several kinds of implicit knowledge, including allowing for the deployment of implicit knowledge to be unreliable sometimes (Compare Chomsky's Competence/Performance distinction, 1965). The ability to do logic and mathematics, as well as many other kinds of things, depends on the use of implicit knowledge, which can be very difficult to make explicit. (At that point I knew nothing about the young science of AI which was beginning to provide new techniques for articulating implicit knowledge.)
..... . IV. Philosophical analysis 372
The ideas about implicit knowledge in Appendix III are used in Appendix IV to explain some of the puzzling features of the activity of conceptual analysis (disagreeing with R.M. Hare's explanation). This leads to further discussion of the nature of philosophical analysis and the claim that it cannot be concerned merely with properties of concepts: it must also be concerned with the world those concepts are used to describe, which may support different sets of concepts. This theme was taken up again many years later in my paper disguishing logical topography from logical geography in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0703
..... .. V. Further examples 381
..... . VI. Apriori knowledge 386
-
..... Bibliography 389 . . . PDF

Downloadable Chapters

Label Size Format
Title page and abstract - sloman.pdf 1.9 MB
Preface, TOC and Ch 1 - sloman.pdf 3.7 MB
Ch 2 - sloman.pdf 8.7 MB
Ch 3 sloman.pdf 7.2 MB
Ch 4 - sloman.pdf 3.9 MB
Ch 5 - sloman.pdf 12.2 MB
Ch 6 - sloman.pdf 12.5 MB
Ch 7 - Sloman.pdf 13 MB
Ch 8 - sloman.pdf 1 MB
Appendices - sloman.pdf 9.7 MB
Bibliography - sloman.pdf 374.4 kB


NOTE: the web page from which the following items were originally copied has been replaced by this one..
Part of the following collections:
Oxford Theses (Useless link!)

Title Information

TitleKnowing and understanding
SubtitleRelations between meaning and truth, meaning and necessary truth, meaning and synthetic necessary truth

Author/Contributor name (Personal) (http://www.ouls.ox.ac.uk/ora/authority)

Name: (family)Sloman
Name: (given)Aaron
Name as on itemA. Sloman
Affiliation (website) http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/
Affiliation (institution)University of Oxford
Affiliation (faculty)Faculty of Literae Humaniores
Affiliation (OxfordCollege)St Antony's College

Author/Contributor name (http://www.ouls.ox.ac.uk/ora/authority)

Name as on itemAaron Sloman
RoleCopyright Holder
Affiliation (rightsOwnership)Sole authorship
Affiliation (ThirdPartyCopyright)No Third Party copyright

Author/Contributor name (Personal) (http://www.ouls.ox.ac.uk/ora/authority)

Name: (family)Pears
Name: (given)D.F.
Name: (Terms of Address)Mr
Role (Text)Supervisor
Type of Resourcetext
Genre (typeofwork)thesis

Origin Information

Date Created1962
Date Issued1962

Language

Language Term (Code) (RFC 3066) en

Physical Description

Digital provenancedigitized other analog
AbstractThe avowed aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. (Not all kinds of meaning are concerned with truth.) After the preliminaries (chapter one), in which the problem is stated and some methodological remarks made, the investigation proceeds in two stages. First there is a detailed inquiry into the manner in which the meanings or functions of words occurring in a statement help to determine the conditions in which that statement would be true (or false). This prepares the way for the second stage, which is an inquiry concerning the connection between meaning and necessary truth (between understanding and knowing apriori). The first stage occupies Part Two of the thesis, the second stage Part Three. In all this, only a restricted class of statements is discussed, namely those which contain nothing but logical words and descriptive words, such as "Not all round tables are scarlet" and "Every three-sided figure is three-angled". (The reasons for not discussing proper names and other singular definite referring expressions are given in Appendix I.)

Subject

GenreMeaning (Philosophy)
Genretruth
TopicPhilosophy
Tiny URL (Handle)http://tinyurl.com/3kdfqf
Identifier (pid)ora:928

Additional Information

Name of DegreeDPhil
Level of DegreeDoctoral


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