Varieties of Affect and the CogAff Architecture Schema

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The proceedings paper and related papers can be found at
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/

This and other slide presentations can be found at
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/talks/
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http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/cogaff.html

Closely related work can be found at Marvin Minsky’s web site, including his draft book The Emotion Machine, available at http://www.media.mit.edu/~minsky/

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1. **A problem:**
   how do our concepts of mind work? We don’t know, but we think we know — our ideas about mind are riddled with confusion.

2. **A diagnosis:**
   part of the problem is that we are like the six blind men trying to describe an elephant, when one feels a tusk, another an ear, another leg, etc.

3. **A pointer:**
   to a good way forward (depending on your motivation in studying emotions).

See also this talk on Varieties of Consciousness:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/talks/#talk9
At least three motivations for interest in computer models of emotions

(i) **Science:**
   An interest in natural emotions (in humans and other animals) as something to be modelled and explained, or an investigation of how they might have evolved, etc.

(ii) **Improved interaction:**
   A desire to give machines which have to interact with humans an understanding of emotions as a requirement for some aspects of that task (Sloman 1992)

(iii) **Entertainment:**
   A desire to produce new kinds of computer-based entertainments where synthetic agents, e.g. software agents or “toy” robots, produce convincing emotional behaviour.

(iv) **Education:**
   Using models of type (i), (ii), etc. in educational tools for trainee psychologists, therapists, etc.

(v) **Therapy:** ???
   If we have a better understanding of the nature of the emotions and other affective states, and their architectural underpinnings, we may be better able to provide helpful therapy when needed.
The conceptual requirements for these objectives are different.

E.g. “believable” behaviour in constrained contexts could be the product of widely different models, including at one extreme very large, hand-coded lookup tables specifying what to do when.

But in the long run a deep and accurate model of the first type may be required for effectively achieving goals of types (ii) and (iii).

For now we address only goal (i) (Science), while keeping an eye on the requirements for the others.

Here is a very simple toy demo of type (iii)/(iv).

(Show sim_feelings demo
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/poplog/sim/teach/sim_feelings)
PROBLEM:

Do we understand what we mean by: “consciousness” “emotion” “intelligence” “mind” “learning” etc .... ???

We understand the language we use about mind for purposes of everyday communication. But we don’t have self-knowledge about what we mean.

We think we do: so we propose definitions with great confidence.

However, different thinkers produce WIDELY differing definitions, of “emotion”, “mind”, “intelligence”, “understanding”, “creativity”, “consciousness”, ..... 

OUR CONFIDENCE IN OUR DEFINITIONS IS MISPLACED

This does not matter much for everyday interactions, writing novels, etc.

But for scientific purposes we MUST diagnose the causes of the confusion, and find better concepts and theories.
EXAMPLES OF CONFUSIONS

Many thinkers disagree on answers to these questions:

- Is surprise an emotion?
  (Some people say “always”, others say “only in certain cases”.)
- If you love your country, is that an emotion, or an attitude?
- Can you have an emotion without being aware of it?
- Does an emotion have to have some externally observable/measurable physiological manifestation?
- Can a fly feel pain, or have emotions?
- Is there a stage at which a human foetus becomes able to have emotions? (E.g. able to hope for good news next month?)
- Could a disembodied mathematician have emotions? (E.g. feel disappointment at finding a flaw in a proof?)

There is no consensus about what emotions are

IT’S WORSE THAN SIX BLIND MEN DESCRIBING AN ELEPHANT!
There are many prejudices that confuse these investigations:

E.g. Some people assume:

- That mind must be “embodied” or
- That emotions are required for intelligence. (Damasio’s non-sequitur)
- That emotions evolved because they are useful
  (Maybe some did. It does not follow that all are useful. 
  Many may be side-effects of *other* useful mechanisms.)
- That you can’t have an emotion without being conscious of it.
- That GOFAI methods have failed, and must be abandoned
  (Just because the silly predictions of some early AI researchers did not come true!)
- That it would be a “bad thing” if robots could have emotions.
  (See papers at [http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/](http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/))
CONFUSIONS ABOUT “EMOTION”

Many different definitions:
  in psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, ethology ...
  and many variants within each discipline

PARTIAL DIAGNOSIS:
  Different theorists concentrate on different phenomena.
  We need a theory that encompasses all the phenomena.

Remember the six blind men trying to describe an elephant?

Some of them are feeling a hippopotamus.
Let’s rephrase the questions:

1. What are the architectural requirements for various kinds of mental states and processes in humans and other animals? And in various kinds of more or less intelligent machines.

2. What sorts of states and processes can each architecture support?

We need to collect examples of many types of real (and theoretically possible) phenomena, humans of many types (young, old, normal, brain-damaged, etc.) and animals of many types. Then try to build a theory which explains them all!

Subject to constraints from neuroscience, psychology, biological evolution, feasibility, tractability, etc.
A GOOD EXPLANATORY THEORY MUST ALLOW FOR VARIATION (different clusters of capabilities):

There are different sorts of variation to be taken into account:

- Across species,
- Within species,
- Within an individual during normal development
- After brain damage
- Across planets (grieving, infatuated, Martians?)
- Across the natural/artificial divide.
WHY STUDY VARIETIES OF ARCHITECTURES?

- As philosophers: we want to understand the space of possibilities, and their implications
- As scientists we are likely to miss things if our search is too focused.
- Moreover, you don’t really understand an architecture unless you understand its advantages and disadvantages compared with neighbours in design space.
  (Trade-offs in different contexts, etc.)
- And in any case there are very different cases in nature.
  Even among humans:
  Infants, children, alzheimers patients, etc.
Which human-like states and processes?

There are AT LEAST THREE different classes of emotions.

- **Primary emotions**
  (evolutionarily oldest)
- **Secondary emotions**
  (mechanisms generating these evolved later)
- **Tertiary emotions**
  (newest and rarest)

**NOTES:**

- These categories, described below, are defined in terms of the information processing architectures (virtual machine architectures) that make them possible.

- They provide only an introduction to the diversity of types of emotions, and the list of types will probably need to be extended after further analysis.

Which kinds of emotions are of most interest in human relations (e.g. which kinds are referred to most in plays, novels, poems, garden fence gossip)?
Primary emotions: (Damasio, Picard, Goleman, etc.)

Examples of primary emotions familiar in humans

You are:

- Startled by a loud noise,
- Frozen in terror as boulder crashes towards you,
- Nauseated by a horrible smell

These require only evolutionarily old reactive mechanisms.

Simple versions even in insects: when flee, fight, feed, freeze, or mate responses override other processes.
(The five Fs!)

In humans these primary emotions often have sophisticated accompaniments that cannot occur in most other animals capable of having primary emotions.

E.g. when we are aware of having them we are using mechanisms that are not needed for primary emotions.
Secondary emotions:
(Damasio, Picard, Goleman, etc.)

Examples — You are:
• Afraid the bridge you are crossing may give way,
• Relieved that you got to the far side safely,
• Afraid the bridge your child is crossing may give way,
• Worried about what to say during your interview,
• Undecided whether to cancel your holiday in ...
• Enjoying the prospect of success in your endeavour,

Some of these are triggered by thinking about what might happen, what might have happened, what did not happen, etc., unlike primary emotions which are triggered only by actual occurrences.

So secondary emotions require deliberative capabilities with ‘what if’, i.e. counterfactual, representational and reasoning capabilities.

These are very subtle and complex requirements.

Probably very few animals: Chimps? Bonobos? Gorillas? Perhaps some other mammals?
Tertiary emotions:

(Previously called “perturbances” by Sloman, Beaudoin, Wright)

Examples — You are:

- Infatuated with someone you met recently,
- Overwhelmed with grief,
- Riddled with guilt about betraying a friend,
- Full of excited anticipation of a loved one’s return,
- Full of longing for your mother,
- Basking in a warm glow of pride after winning an election.
- Obsessed with jealousy about a colleague’s success,

These involve *disruption* of high level *self* monitoring and control mechanisms. I.e. there is some (actual or dispositional) loss of control of thought processes. Thus they cannot occur in animals and machines that are incapable of having such control.

So an architecture including meta-management capabilities is required for tertiary emotions.
In Humans, primary, secondary and tertiary emotions, are not mutually exclusive

All three kinds of emotional processes can coexist in complex situations.

For instance people involved in long and tiring adventure trips often describe multiple emotions at the end, e.g. they may be

- Glad to have succeeded in their aims
- Regretful at not having done better
- Sad that the trip is over
- Relieved that some threat did not materialise (e.g. running out of fuel).
- Glad to see their families again, etc.
- Hoping to be selected for their national team, ...
  etc.
Different architectural underpinnings are required for different categories of emotions

- **Primary emotions:**
  Require sensors feeding signals to fast reactive mechanisms that can under certain conditions trigger rapid global signal patterns sent to motors.

- **Secondary emotions** (central and peripheral):
  Require signals from deliberative mechanisms to fast reactive mechanisms that can under certain conditions trigger rapid global reactions.

- **Tertiary emotions** (with and without peripheral effects):
  Require self-monitoring self-controlling meta-management systems that can be disrupted as in secondary emotions.

All have many variants; Finer distinctions can be made when we understand the underlying architecture.

E.g.

- Purely central and partly peripheral secondary emotions.
- Second-order emotions (being ashamed of feeling jealous).
- Deliberately induced emotions (teacher who – reluctantly – allows himself to get angry to achieve control of a difficult class)
OUR LACK OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE IS PERVERSIVE

Do you know how you recognise a face in different lighting or when seen from different angles?

COMPARE: we can use the syntax of English (French, Urdu, etc.) effortlessly when we speak and hear utterances in a language we know.

But we have very little insight into the grammar of our language, and how the semantics of complex sentences are composed from the semantics of components. We have very little insight into ANY of the workings of our own minds.

Do not assume you know what you mean by “emotion”, “consciousness”, “pleasure”, “pain”, “mood”, etc.

Both our syntax and our conceptual structures are opaque to us: finding out what they are and how they work requires scientific investigation.

We must collect evidence and we must build theories that are rich in explanatory power.
The CogAff project attempts to provide a framework for building such theories and explores ways of basing concepts on them.

Please join us.

**WE INVESTIGATE ARCHITECTURE-BASED CONCEPTS OF MIND**

This involves

- Exploring possible explanatory architectures
- Finding out which sorts of concepts are supported by different sorts of architectures
- Trying to find which architectures provide good explanations for known types of animal minds, human and otherwise.
- Using that to decide which mental concepts are likely to be applicable to which organisms.

**Example:** insects may be able to have (simple) primary emotions but not secondary or tertiary emotions (unless we are wrong about their information processing architectures).
1. Definitions in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions. These don’t work because any collection of behaviours (and behavioural dispositions) can arise out of arbitrarily many different causal mechanisms. Totally convincing “emotional” behaviours could be the product of an expert conman, or a powerful actor on a stage.
Some inadequate approaches (2)

2. Ostensive definitions based on “first person” experience.

These don’t work, though they seduce many scientists and philosophers.

Being able to recognize a subset of instances and non-instances, whether internal or external, does not require a full explicit understanding of the general principles involved.

Compare: thinking you have a grasp of the concept of simultaneity because you have first-hand “direct” experience of simultaneity.

Before Einstein the hidden complexity of “X and Y happened at the same time” went unnoticed.
**A KEY IDEA THAT IS NOT WIDELY UNDERSTOOD**

Our concepts of mind are inherently architecture-based. Evolution somehow developed species that use concepts of mind both for some of their own internal processing (meta-management, described later) and for dealing with other intelligent animals (predators, prey).

I.e. an ontology that is useful for self-management may also be useful for reasoning about others, and vice-versa.

Some aspects of the ontology may be architecture-based (as opposed to simply being related to perceived patterns of behaviour). E.g. you can think of yourself and others as having percepts, desires, beliefs, intentions, attention, etc.

**Conjecture:** in humans (and some other animals?) perceptual mechanisms evolved to use such ontologies?
Why would the ability to perceive mental states evolve?

Think about it:

If you are likely to be eaten by X what is more important for you to perceive:

- The shape of X’s body?
- Whether X can see you?

Primitive implicit theories of mind probably evolved long before anyone was able to talk about theories of mind.

(Evolution solved the “other minds” problem before there were any philosophers to notice the problem.)
Levels in perceptual mechanisms

Seeing the switching Necker cube requires geometrical percepts. 

Seeing the flipping duck-rabbit uses far more subtle and abstract percepts, going beyond geometric and physical properties. (Contrast Marr’s views on vision.)

Things we can see besides geometrical properties:
- Which parts are ears, eyes, mouth, bill, etc.
- Which way something is facing
- Whether someone is happy, sad, angry, etc.
- Whether a painting is in the style of Picasso...
Theories of mind are likely to be produced by evolution

- An organism with some partial ability to monitor, describe, evaluate its own internal states needs an ontology for that purpose.
- The ontology need not be deep or accurate, as long as it works (compare the “naive physics” used by animals to interact with the physical environment).
- The same ontology might be capable of being used also to perceive, think about and interact with other intelligent organisms.
- Using the same ontology is compatible with using quite different mechanism for recognising instances:
  - Using internal perceptual mechanisms for one’s own mental states, processes, events
  - Using external perceptual mechanisms for the mental states, processes, events in other organisms.
  - Both internal and external perception depend on evolutionary changes both in the things being perceived and the mechanisms for perceiving them. (Compare Darwin on evolution of emotional expression.)
Primitive theories support primitive concepts

The theories of mind that evolved to meet biological necessities, are likely to be no more deep or accurate than primitive theories of matter that suffice for moving around in a physical world.

Both are adequate for their purpose.
But both cause problems when used for more sophisticated purposes.

Deeper, richer, more precise theories of the architecture of mind can provide a basis for more powerful sets of concepts of mind.
Physics is easier: so new deep rich theories of the architecture of matter came first.
We need to improve our ordinary concepts for the purposes of scientific understanding

The colloquial concepts work fine for normal purposes of communication, e.g. reporting another person’s state as “asleep”, or “angry”.

But our pre-scientific concepts are based on a poor implicit theory of the architecture:

They are usually good enough for everyday life, but not good enough for scientific explanation or deep modelling.

The verbally specified alternatives used by psychologists to motivate their experiments are not much better: most of them are not trained engineers.

(Likewise most philosophers. And Penrose etc.)

Only someone with software engineering expertise can think clearly about information processing architectures.
Our theory of the architecture of matter supports our concepts of kinds of matter and our concepts of kinds of processes that involve changes of matter.

We can learn from the way our concepts of kinds of matter, kinds of physical stuff, got extended and refined as we learnt about the architecture of matter.

E.g. the periodic table of elements was explained by the theory of the architecture of sub-atomic physics.

Understanding how atoms can and can’t combine generates a space of chemical concepts.

There are concepts of types of process e.g. catalytic reaction, as well as concepts of types of state.
Architecture-based concepts

Many of our concepts are “generated” within an ontology that defines an architecture, e.g. for matter, for mental mechanisms, for social systems, for political systems, for a computer operating system.

We constantly use ontologies referring to virtual machines with complex architectures, even if we are unaware of doing so.

Science extends, corrects, and refines our theories of the underlying architectures.

These are generally architectures for “virtual machines”, not just physical machines.

But they are all ultimately implemented in physical machines.

This leads to many philosophical problems about supervenience, implementation, etc.

See the Cogaff web site, and our IJCAI 2001 tutorial on Philosophy of AI for more on this:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/ijcai01/
We barely understand the variety of virtual machine architectures.

Emergent virtual machines are everywhere.

How many levels of physics will there be in 500 years time?
An architecture supports a collection of concepts

When we understand the architecture of an operating system we can introduce new concepts referring to states and processes that can arise within that architecture:

E.g.

- Various notions of ‘load’ on the system
- The notion of ‘thrashing’
- The notion of ‘deadlock’
- The notion of responsiveness

and many more.

NOTES:

- Some of these concepts would not be applicable in an architecture that does not support concurrent multi-processing.
- The fact that we can use numbers for some of these does not imply that the system has some kind of internal numerical variable representing those states.
- It may use some if it does some self-monitoring!
There are many kinds of information processing architectures, supporting many sets of concepts

Unlike physics:

- Physics has many levels, but there’s still one physics subsuming them all (even if we don’t know all the details yet).
- For minds there is not just ONE architecture but MANY, e.g. architectures for different animals.
- The different architectures support many different sorts of concepts of internal states.
- Flea minds (and emotions)
- Mouse minds (and emotions)
- Cat minds ...
- Chimp minds ...
- Human neonate minds ...
- Your mind ...
We understand only a tiny subset of the space of possible virtual machine architectures for organisms and machines.

Minds of different sorts need different VM architectures. E.g.

- adult human minds, infant human minds,
- chimpanzee minds, rat minds, bat minds,
- flea minds,
- damaged or diseased minds ....

Compare:

- robot minds
- minds of software agents
- distributed minds
Placing the study of human minds in an appropriate context

The vast majority of organisms do NOT have human-like architectures, only more or less sophisticated reactive architectures. (e.g. single-celled organisms, insects, etc.)

We need to place the study of (normal, adult) human mental architectures in the broader context of:

THE SPACE OF possible MINDS

INCLUDING MANY TYPES OF MINDS WITH DIFFERENT ARCHITECTURES THAT MEET DIFFERENT SETS OF REQUIREMENTS, OR FIT DIFFERENT NICHES.
SUGGESTIONS FOR MAKING PROGRESS:

(a) We need to see concepts of mind as “cluster concepts”
(b) We need to see them as “architecture-based” concepts
(c) The relevant architectures are virtual machine architectures implemented in but importantly different from physical machines.

But: what suffices depends on our purposes
WHAT SORT OF ARCHITECTURE?
Could it be an unintelligible mess?

YES, IN PRINCIPLE.

BUT
it can be argued that
evolution could not have
produced a totally
non-modular yet highly
functional brain.

Problem 1:
Time required and variety of contexts required for a suitably general design to evolve.

Problem 2:
Storage space required to encode all possibly relevant behaviours if there’s no “run-time synthesis” module.
Towards a unifying theory of architectures for natural and artificial agents

1. The “triple tower” perspective

There are many variants, e.g. Nilsson, Albus....

Systems can be “nearly decomposable”.
Boundaries can change with learning and development.
ANOTHER COMMON ARCHITECTURAL PARTITION (functional, evolutionary)

2. The “triple layer” perspective

- Meta-management (reflective processes) (newest)
- Deliberative reasoning (”what if” mechanisms) (older)
- Reactive mechanisms (oldest)

(MANY VARIANTS – FOR EACH LAYER)
Features of layered systems

- Reactive systems can be highly parallel, very fast, and use analog circuits.
- Some reactive capabilities may be innate, others learnt.
- Reflexes, with direct connections from sensors to motors, could be separated out from the other reactive mechanisms.
- Deliberative mechanisms are inherently slow, serial, knowledge-based, resource limited.
- Sophisticated deliberative systems require a lot of supporting mechanisms, which may not evolve often, because of their cost.
- Meta-management uses additional mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating, and in some cases modifying or controlling internal states and processes.
- In sophisticated organisms meta-management may use culturally determined categories and procedures (e.g. in guilt and self-torment.)
An architectural “schema” (CogAff) not an architecture.

A grid of co-evolving sub-organisms, each contributing to the niches of the others.
More on the CogAff schema

The CogAff defines a variety of components, and possible information linkages, which may or may not be present in different instances.

To that extent it subsumes a wide variety of possible architectures. It does NOT specify control flow, or dominance of control: many options are left open.

Contrast H-Cogaff – a proposed architecture for human-like systems. (Described below).
Layered architectures have many variants

With different subdivisions and interpretations of subdivisions, and different patterns of control and information flow.

Different principles of subdivision in layered architectures

- evolutionary stages

- levels of abstraction,

- control-hierarchy,
  (Top-down vs multi-directional control)

- information flow
  (e.g. the popular ‘Omega’ \( \Omega \) model of information flow, described below.)
The “Omega” model of information flow

Rejection of layered concurrent perceptual and action towers separate from central tower.

There are many variants, e.g., the “contention scheduling” model. (Shallice, Norman, Cooper, Albus.)

Some authors propose a “will” at the top of the omega.
Another variant (Brooks): Subsumption architectures

Here all the processing is assumed to be reactive, though there are several layers of reactive processing, including adaptive mechanisms.

Brooks denies that animals (even humans) use deliberative mechanisms. Yet he somehow gets to overseas conferences?
Personal opinion: “Nouvelle AI” is of use only in very restricted contexts

The architectures/mechanisms proposed are incapable of meeting requirements for human-like capabilities.

Conjecture:
the people who say no planning, deliberation, symbol-manipulation is needed, actually use those methods in managing their own lives.

Likewise defenders of “dynamical systems”.

Everything is a dynamical system, though not necessarily usefully described by systems of partial differential equations linking continuous variables.

What goes on when YOU think about algebra, or try to find a bug in a computer program, or read a poem?
Shakespeare knew that we are information processing engines:

Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds

Finding and reacting (or not-reacting) to alteration requires sophisticated information processing mechanisms.
SENSING AND ACTING CAN BE ARBITRARILY SOPHISTICATED

- Don’t regard sensors and motors as mere transducers.
- They can have sophisticated information processing architectures.

E.g. perception and action can be hierarchically organised with concurrent interacting sub-systems.
Perception goes far beyond segmenting, recognising, describing what is “out there”

It includes:

- providing information about *affordances* (Gibson, not Marr, but co-evolved beasties better)
- directly triggering physiological reactions e.g. posture control, sexual responses)
- evaluating what is detected,
- triggering new motivations
- triggering “alarm” mechanisms
- . . . . .

AND THESE ALL NEED INTERNAL LANGUAGES OF SOME SORT
An extension of Gibson’s theory:

Different sub-systems use different affordances, and different ontologies.

(Evidence from brain damage.)

They rely on processing by different virtual machines: Wittgenstein:

“The substratum of an experience is mastery of a technique”

(In *Philosophical Investigations* Part 2, section xi.

Our work can be viewed as

**Steps towards an “ecology of mind”**
As processing grows more sophisticated, so it can come slower, to the point of danger.

REMEDY: FAST, POWERFUL, “GLOBAL ALARM SYSTEMS”

ALARM MECHANISMS MUST USE FAST PATTERN-RECOGNITION AND WILL THEREFORE INEVITABLY BE STUPID, AND CAPABLE OF ERROR!

Note: An alarm mechanism is just part of the reactive layer. Drawing it separately merely serves the pedagogic function of indicating the role.

Many variants are possible. E.g. purely innate, or trainable.

E.g. one alarm system or several? (Brain stem, limbic system, ...???)
Many profound implications e.g. for kinds of development, kinds of perceptual processes kinds of brain damage, kinds of emotions. (No time to discuss fully)
VARIETIES OF MOTIVATIONAL SUB-MECHANISMS

MOTIVATION IS NOT JUST ONE THING

- Motives or goals can be short term, long term, permanent.
- They can be triggered by physiology, by percepts, by deliberative processes, by metamanagement.
- They can be implicit in the operation of active mechanisms, or explicit.
- They can be part of the reactive system, part of the deliberative system, part of meta-management.
Motive generators

There are many sorts of motive generators: MG
However, motives may be in conflict, so motive comparators are needed: MC.
But over time new instances of both may be required, as individuals learn, and become more sophisticated:

- Motive generator generators: MGG
- Motive comparator generators: MCG
- Motive generator comparators: MGC
  and maybe more:
    MGGG, MGGC, MCGG, MCGC, MGCG, MGCC, etc?
There are also EVALUATORS

Current state can be evaluated as good, or bad, to be preserved or terminated.
These evaluations can occur at different levels in the system, and in different subsystems.
This can account for many different kinds of pleasures and pains.

Evaluations are often confused with emotions.
But something can be evaluated as good or bad quite unemotionally (coldly).

A special case of evaluation: “error signals” e.g. during feedback control.
NOT ALL PARTS OF THE GRID ARE PRESENT IN ALL ANIMALS

How to design an insect?

Purely reactive but can include adaptation and internal state monitoring.
There various degrees of sophistication in deliberative systems.

The key requirement for the most sophisticated version is a formalism and mechanisms for doing hypothetical reasoning.

The formalisms and mechanisms in other animals are probably much more restrictive than in humans.
EMOTIVE INSECTS?
(with alarm mechanisms)

Alarm mechanisms allow rapid global redirection of processing when certain patterns are detected.
Different versions support different primitive emotions.
ALARM MECHANISM (GLOBAL INTERRUPT/OVERRIDE):

- Allows rapid redirection of the whole system
- sudden dangers
- sudden opportunities
- **FREEZING**
- **FIGHTING, ATTACKING**
- **FEEDING (POUNCING)**
- **GENERAL AROUSAL AND ALERTNESS**  
  (ATTENDING, VIGILANCE)
- **FLEEING**
- **MATING**
- **MORE SPECIFIC TRAINED AND INNATE AUTOMATIC RESPONSES**

What Damasio and Picard call “Primary Emotions” seem to be certain states generated in reactive mechanisms via global alarm systems.
Deliberative mechanisms come in various forms. The most sophisticated ones have complex architectural requirements, indicated only sketchily above.
Secondary emotions

What Damasio and Picard call “Secondary Emotions” seem to be reactions triggered by central cognitive processes in a deliberative mechanism.

Note: Whether these involve the same physiological responses as primary emotions in humans and other animals is an empirical question.

There is no *theoretical* reason why they should *always* do so.

Humans seem to vary in this respect.

E.g. training can suppress normal reactions even though the emotion persists as an internal state (often highly dispositional).

Variable threshold attention filter

META-MANAGEMENT
(reflective)
processes

DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES
(Planning, deciding, ‘What if’ reasoning)

REACTIVE PROCESSES

THE ENVIRONMENT

ALARMS

Long term memory
Motive activation
Personae

perception
action
H-COGAFF is an instance of the CogAff schema using all the components

Described in more detail in papers in the Cogaff directory:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/
ONE OR MORE ALARM MECHANISMS
(Brain stem, limbic system, blinking reflexes, ...

Alarm mechanisms in H-CogAff allow rapid redirection of the whole system or specific parts of the system required for a particular task (e.g. blinking to protect eyes.)

They can include specialised learnt responses: switching modes of thinking after noticing a potential problem.

E.g. doing mathematics, you suddenly notice a new opportunity and switch direction. Maybe this uses an evolved version of a very old alarm mechanism.

The need for (POSSIBLY RAPID) pattern-directed re-direction by meta-management is often confused with the need for emotions e.g. by Damasio, et. al.
Tertiary emotions
(Called “perturbances” in older Cogaff project papers.)

Involve interruption and diversion of thought processes. I.e. the metamanagement layer does not have complete control.

Question:
Is it essential that all sorts of emotions have physiological effects outside the brain, e.g. as suggested by William James?

No:
which do and which do not is an empirical question, and there may be considerable individual differences.

An organism that does not have meta-management cannot control attention, etc. and therefore cannot lose that sort of control, and therefore cannot have tertiary emotions.

It does NOT follow that tertiary emotions are required for intelligent control.

(Damasio’s non-sequitur – mistakenly accepted by many researchers. Perhaps wishful thinking: it would be “nice” to think that emotions are needed for intelligence?)
Different architectural layers support different sorts of emotions, and help us define architecture-based ontologies for different sorts of minds.

Different animals will have different mental ontologies.
Humans at different stages of development will have different mental ontologies.

**THE THIRD LAYER**

enables

**SELF-MONITORING, SELF-EVALUATION**
and
**SELF-CONTROL**

AND THEREFORE ALSO LOSS OF CONTROL (TERTIARY EMOTIONS: PERTURBANCES)
and qualia (through concurrent self-monitoring e.g. of sensory databases)!
NOTES:

1. Different aspects of love, hate, jealousy, pride, ambition, embarrassment, grief, infatuation can be found in all three categories of emotions.

2. Remember that these are not static states but developing processes, with very varied aetiology. Different forms of development correspond to different sorts of emotions.

3. We don’t necessarily already have names for all the significantly different cases.

4. Not all emotions are necessarily useful. Some can be seriously dysfunctional.
SOCIALY IMPORTANT
HUMAN EMOTIONS

INVOLVE RICH CONCEPTS AND KNOWLEDGE AND HIGH LEVEL CONTROL MECHANISMS (architectures)

Example: longing for someone or something:

- Semantics:
  To long for something you need to know of its existence, its remoteness, and the possibility of being together again.

- Control:
  One who has deep longing for X does not merely occasionally think it would be wonderful to be with X. In deep longing thoughts are often *uncontrollably* drawn to X. Moreover, such longing may impact on various kinds of high level decision making as well as the focus of attention.

Physiological processes (outside the brain) may or may not be involved. Their importance is over-stressed by some experimental psychologists.
SUMMARY

1. We can reduce conceptual muddles regarding emotion, etc. by trying to use architecture-based concepts.
2. Different architectures are relevant in different contexts (e.g. infants, adults, other animals). So we need to explore different families of concepts (e.g. for describing infants, chimps, cats, people with brain damage).
3. Finding out which architectures are relevant is a hard research problem. We suggest that humans have three architectural layers that manifest themselves not only centrally but also in perception and action sub-systems. Most other animals have only a subset.
4. At least three (and several more if we look closely) classes of affective states and processes can be distinguished, related to different architectural layers.
5. Many other concepts (e.g. “learning”, “belief”, “motivation”, “intentional action”) can be refined on the basis of hypothesised architectures.
Summary continued

6. The complexity and variety of affective states and processes supported by the H-Cogaff architecture can explain some of the confusion in the literature: different researchers focus on different subsets. hence their definitions and theories are different.

8. The ability to have emotions is a *side-effect* of mechanisms required for intelligence (as argued in IJCAI-1981). Contrast the illogical use of facts about frontal lobe damage to infer that intelligence *requires* emotions.
CONCLUSION

• Much of this is conjectural – many details still have to be filled in and consequences developed (both of which can come partly from building working models, partly from multi-disciplinary empirical investigations).

• An architecture-based ontology can bring some order into the morass of studies of affect (e.g. myriad definitions of “emotion” are explained as based on partial views).

• This can lead to a better approach to comparative psychology, developmental psychology (the architecture develops after birth), and the study of effects of brain damage and disease.

• The CogAff schema provides a conceptual framework for discussing which kinds of emotions can arise in various kinds of artificial agents, e.g. software agents that lack the reactive mechanisms required for controlling a physical body.

• All this may be relevant not only to science, but also to ambitious engineering objectives listed at the beginning.
THE BIRMINGHAM COGNITION AND AFFECT PROJECT

OVERVIEW:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/cogaff.html

PAPERS:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/
(References to other work can be found in papers in this directory)

TOOLS:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/poplog/freepoplog.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/cogaff/simagent.html
(the SIM_AGENT toolkit)

SLIDES FOR TALKS:

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/talks/
(including this talk)