Lecture 19: cryptographic algorithms

Operating Systems and Networks

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Overview

• Cryptographic algorithms
  – symmetric: TEA
  – asymmetric: RSA

• Digital signatures
  – digital signatures with public key
  – secure digest function

• Authentication
  – secret-key Needham-Schroeder
  – scenarios
Cryptographic algorithms

• Symmetric (secret key): TEA, DES
  – secret key shared between principals
  – encryption with non-destructive ops (XOR) plus transpose
  – decryption possible only if key known
  – brute force attack (check \(\{M\}_k\) for all values of key)
    hard (exponential in no of bits in key)

• Asymmetric (public key): RSA
  – pair of keys (very large numbers), one public and one private
  – encryption with public key
  – decryption possible only if private key known
  – factorising large numbers (over 150 decimal digits)
    hard
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA)

• Simple, symmetric (secret key) algorithm
  – written in C [Wheeler & Needham 1994]

• How it works
  – key 128 bits \(k[0]..k[3]\)
  – plaintext 64 bits (2 x 32 bits, text[0], text[1])
  – in 32 rounds combines plaintext and key, swapping the two halves of plaintext
  – uses reversible addition of unsigned integers, XOR \(^\) and bitwise shift \(<<, >>\)
  – combines plaintext with constant delta to obscure key

• Decryption via inverse operations.
TEA Encryption function

```c
void encrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) {
    unsigned long y = text[0], z = text[1];
    unsigned long delta = 0x9e3779b9, sum = 0; int n;
    for (n = 0; n < 32; n++) {
        sum += delta;
        y += ((z << 4) + k[0]) ^ (z + sum) ^ ((z >> 5) + k[1]);
        z += ((y << 4) + k[2]) ^ (y + sum) ^ ((y >> 5) + k[3]);
    }
    text[0] = y; text[1] = z;
}
```
void decrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) {
    unsigned long y = text[0], z = text[1];
    unsigned long delta = 0x9e3779b9, sum = delta << 5; int n;
    for (n = 0; n < 32; n++) {
        z -= ((y << 4) + k[2]) ^ (y + sum) ^ ((y >> 5) + k[3]);
        y -= ((z << 4) + k[0]) ^ (z + sum) ^ ((z >> 5) + k[1]);
        sum -= delta;
    }
    text[0] = y; text[1] = z;
}
Other symmetric algorithms

- **TEA**
  - simple & concise, yet secure and reasonably fast
- **DES (The Data Encryption Standard 1977)**
  - US standard for business applications till recently
  - 64 bit plaintext, 56 bit key
  - cracked in 1997 (secret challenge message decrypted)
  - triple-DES (key 112 bits) still secure, poor performance
- **AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)**
  - invitation for proposals 1997
  - in progress
  - key size 128, 192 and 256 bits
RSA

- Rivest, Shamir and Adelman ‘78
- How it works
  - relies on $N = P \times Q$ (product of two very large primes)
  - factorisation of $N$ hard
  - choose keys $e$, $d$ such that
    $e \times d = 1 \mod Z$ where $Z = (P-1) \times (Q-1)$
- It turns out...
  - can encrypt $M$ by $M^e \mod N$
  - can decrypt by $C^d \mod N$ ($C$ is encrypted message)
- Thus
  - can freely make $e$ and $N$ public, while retaining $d$
RSA: past, present and future

• In 1978...
  – Rivest et al thought factorising numbers > $10^{200}$ would take more than four billion years

• Now (ca 2000)
  – faster computers, better methods
  – numbers with 155 (= 500 bits) decimal digits successfully factorised
  – 512 bit keys insecure!

• The future?
  – keys with 230 decimal digits (= 768 bits) recommended
  – 2048 bits used in some applications (e.g. defence)
Digital signatures

• Why needed?
  – alternative to handwritten signatures
  – authentic, difficult to forge and undeniable

• How it works
  – relies on secure hash functions which compress a message into a so called *digest*
  – sender *encrypts* *digest* and *appends* to message as a signature
  – receiver *verifies* signature
  – generally public key cryptography used, but secret key also possible
Digital signatures with public key

• **Keys**
  – sender chooses key pair $K_{pub}$ and $K_{pri}$; key $K_{pub}$ made public

• **Sending signed message $M$**
  – sender uses an agreed secure hash function $h$ to compute digest $h(M)$
  – digest $h(M)$ is encrypted with private key $K_{pri}$ to produce signature $S = \{h(M)\}_{K_{pri}}$; the pair $M$, $S$ sent

• **Verifying signed message $M$, $S$**
  – when pair $M$, $S$ received, signature $S$ decrypted using $K_{pub}$, digest $h(M)$ computed and compared to decrypted signature

• **Note**
  – RSA can be used, but roles of keys reversed.
Digital signatures with public key

**Signing**

- $M$
- $H(M) \rightarrow h$
- $E(K_{pri}, h) \rightarrow \{h\}_{K_{pri}}$
- 128 bits

**Verifying**

- $\{h\}_{K_{pri}} \rightarrow D(K_{pub}, \{h\}) \rightarrow h' \rightarrow h = h'?$

- $H(doc) \rightarrow h$
- $M$
Secure digest functions

• Based on one-way hash functions:
  – given M, easy to compute h(M)
  – given h, hard to compute M
  – given M, hard to find another M’ such that h(M) = h(M’)

• Note
  – operations need not be information preserving
  – function not reversible

• Example: MD5 [Rivest 1992][
  – 128 bit digest, using non-linear functions applied to segments of source text
Authentication

• Definition
  – protocol for ensuring authenticity of the sender

• Secret-key protocol [Needham & Schroeder ‘78]
  – based on secure key server that issues secret keys
  – see this lecture and textbook (5 steps)
  – flaw corrected ‘81
  – implemented in Kerberos

• Public-key protocol [Needham & Schroeder ‘78]
  – does not require secure key server (7 steps)
  – flaw discovered with CSP/FDR
  – SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) similar to it
Needham-Schroeder secret-key

• Principals
  – client A (initiates request), server B
  – secure server S

• Secure server S
  – maintains table with name + secret key for each principal
  – upon request by client A, issues key for secure communication between client A and server B, transmitted in encrypted form (‘ticket’)

• Messages
  – labelled by nonces (integer values added to message to indicate freshness)
# Needham-Schroeder secret-key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>Message</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A→S:</td>
<td>A, B, N&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>A requests S to supply a key for communication with B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. S→A:</td>
<td>{N&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;, B, K&lt;sub&gt;AB&lt;/sub&gt;, {K&lt;sub&gt;AB&lt;/sub&gt;, A}&lt;sub&gt;KB&lt;/sub&gt;}</td>
<td>S returns a message encrypted in A’s secret key, containing a newly generated key (K_{AB}) and a ‘ticket’ encrypted in B’s secret key. The nonce (N_A) demonstrates that the message was sent in response to the preceding one. A believes that S sent the message because only S knows A’s secret key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A→B:</td>
<td>{K&lt;sub&gt;AB&lt;/sub&gt;, A}&lt;sub&gt;KB&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>A sends the ‘ticket’ to B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. B→A:</td>
<td>{N&lt;sub&gt;B&lt;/sub&gt;}&lt;sub&gt;KAB&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>B decrypts the ticket and uses the new key (K_{AB}) to encrypt another nonce (N_B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A→B:</td>
<td>{N&lt;sub&gt;B&lt;/sub&gt; - 1}&lt;sub&gt;KAB&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>A demonstrates to B that it was the sender of the previous message by returning an agreed transformation of (N_B).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Problems!

• In step 3
  – message need not be fresh...

• So...
  – intruder with $K_{AB}$ and $\{K_{AB}, A\}_K$ (left in cache, etc) can initiate exchange with B, impersonating A
  – secret key $K_{AB}$ compromised

• Solution
  – add nonce or timestamp to message 3, yielding
    $\{K_{AB}, A,t\}_{K_{Bpub}}$
  – B decrypts message and checks t recent
  – adapted in Kerberos
Summary

• Symmetric encryption
  – DES: most widely used till recently, 56-bit key insecure
  – 3DES, AES or IDEA an alternative
• Asymmetric encryption
  – RSA: 512-bit key insecure, use with 768-bit keys or above
• Authentication with secret-key
  – Kerberos, based on [Needham-Schroeder ‘78]
• Authentication with public-key
  – SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
  – used in electronic commerce