This page contains publications on mental-states research
with no metaphorical or connectionist angle.
Click HERE for publications on relationships between mental states and metaphor.
Please email me (J.A.Barnden@cs.bham.ac.uk) to ask for a paper or further information.
Barnden, J.A. & Peterson, D.M. (2001). Artificial intelligence, mindreading and reasoning in law.
Cardozo Law Review, 22 (5-6), pp.1381-1406.
Barnden, J.A. (2001). Uncertain reasoning about agents' beliefs and reasoning.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 9, pp.115-152. preprint
Also as Technical Report CSRP-98-11, School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, U.K.
Barnden, J.A. (1996). Unconscious gaps in Jackendoff's `How Language Helps Us Think'?
Pragmatics and Cognition, 4(1), pp.65-80.
Barnden, J.A. (1995). Simulative reasoning, common-sense psychology and artificial intelligence.
In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, pp.247-273. Oxford: Blackwell. preprint
Stein, G.C. & Barnden, J.A. (1995). Towards more flexible and common-sensical reasoning about beliefs.
In Proceedings of the 1995 AAAI Spring Symposium on Representing Mental States and Mechanisms.
Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press. preprint
Barnden, J.A. (1987). Interpreting propositional attitude reports: towards greater freedom and control.
In B. du Boulay, D. Hogg & L. Steels (Eds), Advances in artificial intelligence - II, pp.159-173.
Amsterdam: Elsevier (North-Holland).
Barnden, J.A. (1986). Imputations and explications: representational problems in treatments of propositional attitudes.
Cognitive Science, 10(3), pp.319-364.
Barnden, J.A. (1986). A viewpoint distinction in the representation of propositional attitudes.
In Procs. 5th National Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pp.411-415.
Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann. the paper
Barnden, J.A. (1983). Intensions as such: an outline.
In Procs. 8th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pp.280-286.
Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Last mod - 6 March 2019