The Effect of Splitting Populations on Bidding Strategies

Created by W.Langdon from gp-bibliography.bib Revision:1.3872

@InProceedings{ashlock:1997:spbs,
  author =       "Dan Ashlock and Charles Richter",
  title =        "The Effect of Splitting Populations on Bidding
                 Strategies",
  booktitle =    "Genetic Programming 1997: Proceedings of the Second
                 Annual Conference",
  editor =       "John R. Koza and Kalyanmoy Deb and Marco Dorigo and 
                 David B. Fogel and Max Garzon and Hitoshi Iba and 
                 Rick L. Riolo",
  year =         "1997",
  month =        "13-16 " # jul,
  keywords =     "genetic algorithms, genetic programming",
  pages =        "27--34",
  address =      "Stanford University, CA, USA",
  publisher_address = "San Francisco, CA, USA",
  publisher =    "Morgan Kaufmann",
  URL =          "http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/W.Langdon/ftp/papers/gp1997/ashlock_1997_spbs.pdf",
  size =         "8 pages",
  abstract =     "In this paper we explore the effects of splitting a
                 single population of artificial agents engaging in a
                 simple double auction game into two competing
                 populations by modifying experiments reported in
                 [Ashlock, 1997]. The original paper used a new genetic
                 programming tool, termed GP-Automata, to induce bidding
                 strategies with a genetic algorithm for Nash's game
                 divide the dollar. The motivation for performing the
                 research is the biological notion of inclusive fitness
                 and kinship theory. The a priori hypothesis of the
                 authors was that behaviour of the agents in the
                 simulated market would change substantially when they
                 were no longer forced to be similar to one another by
                 the genetic mechanism used to induce new bidding
                 strategies. While breeding takes place only within each
                 population, all bidding is between agents from
                 different populations. The agents in the original
                 (single population) paper strongly favoured {"}fair{"}
                 Nash equilibria of the divide the dollar game, at odds
                 with the economic theory for egoistic agents. When
                 controls for kinship effects are implemented by
                 splitting the population a substantial effect is
                 observed. When agents doing the bidding are not close
                 genetic kin to one another the 'unfair' Nash equilbria
                 regain a great deal of their former prominence. This
                 result is of importance to any sort of evolutionary
                 algorithm creating artificial agents, as kinship theory
                 can confound game-theoretic predictions that assume
                 egoistic agents. The current research also arguably
                 increases the level of realism in the simulation of a
                 double auction market.",
  notes =        "GP-97",
}

Genetic Programming entries for Daniel Ashlock Charles W Richter Jr

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