This document makes connections with the discussion of perception of
affordances of various kinds, generalising Gibson's ideas, in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#gibson
Talk 93: What's vision for, and how does it work?
From Marr (and earlier) to Gibson and Beyond
Some of the ideas are related to perception of impossible objects.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/impossible.html
A partial index of discussion notes is in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/AREADME.html
This is part of the Turing-inspired Meta-Morphogenesis project, summarised here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
It also relates to an attempt to produce new Biological Evolutionary foundations
for mathematics (BEFM) based on the roles of various kinds of construction kits
in biological evolution. Natural selection depends on mathematical properties
of construction kits, including the "Fundamental construction kit" provided by
Physics+Chemistry, from which Evolution repeatedly derives and uses new
construction kits. It thereby (blindly) discovers and proves mathematical
theorems about what is possible, theorems that it puts to good use in creating
instances of those possibilities in the form of new biological materials,
mechanisms, functions, types of information, mechanisms for processing and
using information, new species, and new products of interactions between
species and their environments).
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/construction-kits.html
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/compositionality.html
There are also pdf versions of all the above documents.
Her proof, using a rotated arrow, is compared with "standard" proofs here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/triangle-sum.html
The sequence of pictures below (from left to right) summarises her proof.
Inspired by thinking about Mary Pardoe's proof I once began to investigate a
variant of Euclidean geometry (called "P-Geometry", in recognition of her
contribution) in which the parallel postulate plays no role, but in which any
line segment in a plane can be moved around in the plane, maintaining its
length, and if such a motion includes a rotation, the angle of rotation has a
numerical measure. An incomplete discussion of P-Geometry is here (still work
in progress):
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/p-geometry.html
More recently I learnt that a natural extension to Euclidean geometry known as the "Neusis" construction (discussed further in the Appendix below, possibly discovered by Archimedes) is a natural extension of Euclidean geometry that allows any angle to be trisected as shown below.
The Neusis extension is very closely related to P-geometry, insofar as both allow line-segments to be translated and rotated subject to constraints.
The Neusis construction allows a straight edge with two marks a fixed distance
apart, to be rotated and translated subject to various constraints. Although
this construction was apparently rejected as an extension to Euclidean geometry
it is hard to see any justification for the rejection. Euclid had already
allowed a pair of compasses to be moved in various ways while the end points
remained a fixed distance apart, so why not allow a marked line segment to be
moved while its marks remain a fixed distance apart?
A proof that the Neusis construction works is presented in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angle_trisection#With_a_marked_ruler
and in
This article.
However, since the proof is not easy to follow if one is unfamiliar with such reasoning, I offer a slightly clearer (I hope) presentation here, showing how it uses the feature of P-geometry that allows a fixed length line segment (the segment shown in blue, with two arrow heads) to be moved around in a plane, subject to certain constraints, changing its location and its orientation, but not its length.
The proof is in three stages. For some readers the middle stage will be redundant. Like the Pardoe proof of the triangle sum theorem, this proof is best thought of as using not a static diagram, but a process in which a part of the diagram moves subject to constraints.
_________________________________________________________________________
Stage 1:
_________________________________________________________________________
Stage 2:
_________________________________________________________________________
Stage 3:
A copy of that blue segment slides to the right, with its lower end always on the diameter of the circle, if necessary extended beyond the circle on the right, and its other end always pointing at its original location, B on the circle. So the sliding process has three constraints:
2. The line containing the moving segment always passes through location B, on the circle.
3. The length of the moving segment is constant.
The drawings show the initial stage, an intermediate stage and the final stage In Stage 2, as the right end of the blue segment C' slides to the right, the position of the left end D' keeps changing so that the distance C'D' remains equal to OB, and the orientation of the segment changes so that its extension always goes through point B, as shown in stages 2 and 3.
After the blue line has moved to the intermediate position C'D' shown in Stage 2, it continues sliding to the final destination CD shown in Stage 3, maintaining its length, and maintaining its relationship with point B.
The final destination is defined as the point at which the left end of the blue arrow lies on the circumference of the original circle, and its extension passes through B.
-- Proof that Angle 'c' is one third of Angle 'o':
Stage 3 repeated here for convenience of the reader:
Consider the triangle ODC: it has two sides the same length (OD, and CD) so the corresponding angles COD and OCD, are equal, both marked 'c'. It follows that the angle ODB, marked as having angle 'd', which is external to triangle COD, is the sum of the two opposite angles, OCD and COD, i.e.
d = c + c
Now consider the triangle ODB. The sides OD and OB are the same length (radii of the circle), therefore the triangle is isosceles and angle ODB, previously marked 'd' must be the same as angle OBD, now also marked 'd'.
Now consider triangle OBC. Two of its angles, OCB and OBC have been marked as having sizes c and d respectively. They must sum to the external angle of that triangle, namely angle AOB, our starting angle, marked 'o'.
Therefore
o = c + d but d = c + c therefore o = c + c + cTherefore c is one third of o, so we have trisected angle AOB. The angles marked 'c', i.e. angles OCD and COD, are exactly one third of AOB.
NOTE:
This construction started with an acute angle, AOB. If B had been moved round
towards where D is, the angle would have been obtuse. The construction would
then have to be different. Explaining why it would have to be different, and how
to change it is left as an exercise for the reader.
Note added 20 Jul 2015:
How can we be sure that, provided that the initial angle AOB is less than a
right angle (less than 90 degrees), the described constrained motion of the line
segment will eventually reach the stopping state, i.e. left end of the segment
on the circle, the right end on the line through A and O, and the extension of
the line passing through point B?
It's "obvious" .. but why? What are the implications for P-geometry?
If the starting angle AOB is greater than a right angle the construction has to be changed. How to do this is left as an exercise.
When David Hilbert published a logical axiomatisation of Euclidean geometry, Frege objected (roughly) that the axiomatisation was not about geometry, but about structures in another branch of (formalised) mathematics that happened to be isomorphic with at least a part of geometry.
For reasons that are not clear to me, Frege thought that his formalisation of arithmetic is not open to the same charge of "changing the subject". I think it is, as argued in my 1962 Oxford DPhil thesis defending Immanuel Kant's philosophy of mathematics.
NOTE (19 Jun 2016):
The thesis repeatedly used the impossibility of trisecting an angle as an example of a mathematical discovery illustrating Kant's claims. In principle the precise wording should now be revised, to allow for the possibility of adding the 'neusis' construction to Euclidean geometry.
Thanks to efforts of a former student, Luc Beaudoin, the thesis (originally scanned by the Bodleian library in 2007) has now been retyped, and is available fully digitised, with searchable text, here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/sloman-1962
Two comments:
It seems that Frege, in effect, argued that Hilbert's axiomatisation of Geometry had changed the subject: instead of referring to geometrical structures and relationships the new axioms referred only to logical structures and relationships.
But Frege did not think this charge of changing the subject also applied to his own axiomatisation of arithmetic. My view was that Frege (like Kant) was right about geometry (i.e. it can be modelled logically but the original subject is not logic).
However, Frege was wrong about arithmetic being reduced to logic, since any logical formalisation of arithmetic, like any formalisation of geometry can be assessed according to how well it characterises what existed before the formalisation. For that, we need a good non-logical (or pre-logical) characterisation of arithmetical knowledge, comparable to the pre-logical characterisation of topological and geometric knowledge of spatial structures and processes, based on diagrams and imagined or experienced spatial configurations and processes. This topic is discussed further below.
An answer to that will need to be developed as part of the Meta-Morphogenesis project. I expect the answer to show how, as a result of the achievements of biological evolution, human brains, after appropriate stages of development after birth, have the potential to support non-empirical discoveries about spatial structures and processes, based on proofs exploring the scopes and limits of those structures and processes.
We can also construct models of those spatial structures and processes in arithmetic, as Descartes showed in his arithmetisation of geometry. But those models are new mathematical structures: they don't explain what the original knowledge was about. Likewise, when a mathematician produces a logical axiomatisation of Euclidean (or any other kind of) geometry, the original subject matter of geometry is clearly different from knowledge about a collection of logical axioms, definitions, and inference rules. Euclid, and Euclid's forebears knew nothing about the latter: since formalised logic, begun in a limited way by Aristotle, did not reach maturity till the 19th and 20th centuries. It was not available to the mathematicians who originally discovered and explored geometry.
When someone later on discovered Origami geometry, perhaps as a result of playing with ways of folding paper (either using real paper or imagined paper) or came to think of geometry as allowing line segments to be moved and rotated in a plane, as in P-geometry, it is clear that this was a significant discovery that extended what had previously been known about Euclidean geometry, because the extended version does, and the earlier version does not, include a general procedure for trisecting angles, described above.
The possibility of that extension was already there in the structure of the space we perceive and act in, before humans noticed and discussed it. If those points are accepted, then that will provide support for the project of trying to understand the nature and content of geometric knowledge, and how it evolved, without treating that as merely an investigation of how human mathematicians discovered and explored a new logical structure. Moreover, it will need not have anything specific to do with human mathematicians since the same considerations will apply to any sort of mathematician able to think about the same topics -- waiting to be discovered before humans existed.
When Mary Pardoe first discovered her proof of the triangle sum theorem, she was not merely discovering that a new purely logical inference was possible starting from axioms she had previously been using, and neither was she merely exploring possible ways of assembling consistent sets of axioms and exploring the consequences.
Rather, while teaching mathematics she noticed for the first time a (pre-existing) feature of the realm of spatial structures and processes she was already familiar with, a feature that other mathematicians had not used in proving the triangle sum theorem. However, they had noticed that the ability to slide a marked straight edge around in the plane did allow constructions that were previously impossible in Euclidean geometry, including the above construction to trisect an angle.
It seems that that aspect of Euclidean geometry has not yet been studied in very great depth, since it if had been, it is likely that there would have been many reported discoveries, and re-discoveries, of the P-geometry proof of the triangle sum theorem. However an extension to standard Euclidean geometry closely related to P-geometry described in The Appendix, below had been discovered by Archimedes and used to trisect an angle.
Did Einstein's theory of general relativity and the observations made during the 1919 solar eclipse (and more reliable observations later on) prove that geometry is empirical as often claimed?
No. The fact that Euclid's parallel axiom was found empirically not to fit large
scale physical space, does not turn it into a mere empirical generalisation.
There is a realm of mathematical reality, including non-Euclidean geometries,
that had been discovered and explored before Einstein, by considering the
implications of removing the parallel axiom from Euclid's axioms. That leaves a
set of features (summarised in a subset of Euclid's axioms) that jointly specify
a "core" type of space that does not intrinsically determine what happens if
lines are extended indefinitely. Work by mathematicians before Einstein had
shown that that core type of space could be extended in different ways that led
to several distinct, interestingly different, sub-types of space, namely
Euclidean space, with the parallel axiom, elliptical space (in which there are
no parallel pairs of lines), and hyperbolic space in which a sort of parallelism
has infinitely many sub-cases. For more details see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Euclidean_geometry
Within the framework of this expanded mathematical theory specifying a variety of types of space, with interestingly different theorems, there is indeed an empirical question about which type characterises the physical space we inhabit. That empirical question was answered theoretically by Einstein and his answer was confirmed empirically, initially by the observed displacement of stars during a solar eclipse, and later by many other measurements. But the discoveries of the non-Euclidean geometries, like discoveries of prime numbers and different sorts of equations, were non-empirical mathematical discoveries.
The non-empirical mathematical discovery preceding the empirical confirmation is that the type of geometry discussed by Euclid has a subset of features that can be expanded in different ways, one of which produces Euclidean geometry, while the other expansions produce non-Euclidean spaces. One of the reasons why this is mathematically interesting, is that each of the types of space raises interesting new questions, about which non-trivial new theorems can be proved. (When there are practical applications, such as predicting planetary motions, that adds to the importance of the mathematics.)
The unexpected empirical discovery by physicists was that one of the non-Euclidean alternatives best fits our physical space, although the deviations from Euclidean geometry are not normally noticeable. All this suggests that most of Euclidean geometry, without the parallel axiom, characterises physical space: that is an empirical claim that may prove to be false if there are regions of physical space (possibly on microscopic scales) where more of the Euclidean axioms break down.
What does not seem to have been widely appreciated is that Euclidean geometry with or without the parallel axiom can be extended to form P-geometry, as discussed above. So the Euclidean axioms, like the axioms of projective geometry, and the axioms (not yet fully formalised) of P-geometry, permitting translation and rotation of fixed-length line segments, characterise geometrically possible spaces, not merely logically possible sets of axioms. It may turn out that the defining features of P-geometry entail the parallel axiom. That would be another mathematical discovery. In that case, another possibility is that Euclidean geometry is a subset of P-geometry in the sense that all the geometric constructions possible in Euclidean geometry are also possible in P-geometry, but not vice-versa.
So perhaps the only theorems of Euclidean geometry that will turn out false in P-geometry are theorems of the form "no construction of type X is possible", e.g. "no construction guaranteed to trisect an angle is possible".
He implicitly, and very briefly, discusses something like P-geometry (without naming it) when he points out that there are different geometries: some of them, but not all, allow motion of a figure all the lines of which remain of a constant length. P-geometry would be an example of that subset. It is possible that he had previously learnt about the Neusis construction discussed in the Appendix, or had reinvented something like it.
After discussing the existence of various geometries with different collections of axioms and theorems, he writes:
I think Poincaré was nearly right, but not quite. The ability to select, characterise and label a particular type of geometry requires more than just the formulation of a definition. It presupposed mathematical discoveries concerning possible types of space, and in particular alternatives to Euclidean space. Compare a mythical community who had first discovered that a closed figure bounded by straight lines is possible when they first drew or thought of a triangle, or found a naturally existing triangular shape. They could then have started exploring properties of triangles, teaching that as a branch of mathematics, one of whose axioms was something like "Every shape has three sides" -- the axiom of triangularity.
Later someone might discover a quadrilateral, or a pentagon, and then complain that the axiom of Triangularity is just an arbitrary definition, which could just as well be replaced by "Every figure has three or four sides". But further research would show that neither triangles nor quadrilaterals, nor their union, exhausted the space of possible closed figures. (Piaget's posthumously published book on Possibility shows similar stages of development in considering possibilities in children between the ages of about three and thirteen. A deep challenge for developmental psychology, neuroscience and AI is to explain and model what happens during such development.)
At that point attention could switch to finding out what sorts of closed shape can exist and then different branches of shape research could develop studying polygonal shapes with different numbers of sides, convex shapes, non-convex shapes, shapes bounded by curves, etc.
Definitions, perhaps labelled as axioms, could be used to introduce new labels for particular types of shape under investigation. But far from being trivial new abbreviations for arbitrary combinations of features (e.g. "A quachelor is an unmarried male who has proposed marriage unsuccessfully to four different women"), the new axioms, in combination with more general axioms characterising a space of possibilities, usefully delimit non-trivial sub-fields of mathematical investigation. Moreover, the implicit existential claim that the sub-field has instances, or can have instances, ensures that such new axioms, whether regarded as definitions or not, express significant content.
(The APPENDIX below contains further discussion on how to view the axioms describing possible constructions and their properties, in different geometries.)
Checking well formedness and checking derivability of a formula within a particular system require abilities to reason about a class of linear structures, e.g. to infer what the consequence will be of substituting a particular symbol or structure for instances of a variable in the formula. In other words, doing mathematics as a formalist requires specific mathematical abilities that are as sophisticated as the abilities required to study geometry. But they are different abilities. This point was made in my 1962 thesis and has also been made by others (Hilbert?). It demonstrates that even a formalist philosophy of mathematics cannot avoid the task of explaining what sorts of cognitive competences are involved in doing mathematics and understanding enough about a domain of structures to be able to cope with a novel one.
Moreover, although a Turing machine or modern computer can operate on symbolic structures that are treated as composed of symbolic structures with no inner structure (e.g. bits), human mathematicians using logical formalisms have located their symbols in the same perceptual spaces as they use for the rest of their life. And the ability to do that needs to be analysed and explained. From my point of view, the ability to do logic, algebra or manipulate symbolic structures is just another mathematical ability that somehow arose within an evolutionary trajectory, and needs to be explained as part of a general explanation of the nature of mathematical abilities. (Some of those abilities have been replicated in AI systems, e.g. theorem provers, parsers, etc. but so far only with narrowly focused meta-linguistic capabilities. I doubt that any current AI system could have discovered the natural numbers and invented the notations we now use for representing numbers. (Doug Lenat's PhD thesis described a system AM that had a subset of the required capabilities. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_Mathematician)
My attempts to answer some of these questions in more detail, in a long-term project investigating Biological Evolutionary Foundations of mathematics (still in its early phases) are presented in a paper on construction kits of various types (work in progress) and their roles in evolution and individual development.
The existence of these interesting, deep, mathematically explorable abstract spaces is not a trivial theorem of logic. Rather logic is one of the spaces.
There are other collections that cannot be put into a one to one correspondence with the union of two or more equinumerous collections. Proving that that is impossible for collections of 7, 13, 19 objects, for example, is at first sight harder if the objects are not all of the same size and shape. But that can be remedied by starting with rectangular blocks all the same size, then showing that if S and T are in a one-one correspondence and S can be factored, then so can T, then showing that any finite collection of objects can be put into a one-one correspondence with a collection of cubes, or squares, all the same size.
Examples relating to both arithmetic and geometry (including topology) are
presented in this incomplete discussion of "toddler theorems":
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/toddler-theorems.html
Both are parts of the Meta-Morphogenesis project:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
How the concept of 'primeness' can be discovered spatially is discussed here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/toddler-theorems.html#primes
A different proof of the triangle sum theorem, using external rotation angles (complementary to the internal
angles of the triangle) was discovered by Kay Hughes (QinetiQ) in 2013, while we
were informally discussing mathematics education (at the dinner of my wife's
Orienteering club), as reported here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/triangle-sum.html#kay
It took her about five minutes of thinking, without use of pencil, paper, etc.
It is normally described in terms of extending Euclidean planar geometry by allowing use of a rigid but movable straight-edge or straight line S (e.g. a ruler) with one or more locations marked on the S, one of which is a "Tracker point" T which is fixed on S but able to move in the plane, a straight or curved line "Guide line" G in the plane which is used to "guide" the motion of S, a "pivot point" P fixed in the plane with which S must remain in contact as it slides in the plane, and another straight or curved line the "Catch line", which can be used to express a constraint on the motion of S.
The motion has two main constraints:
If the guide line G is straight and the tracker and pivot points T and P both lie on G, then the straight-edge S will move on G and its orientation will not change. In all other cases as T moves, S will rotate around the pivot point P.
If G is a circle with centre at P, then the point on S that coincides with P will not move on S. In all other cases, as T moves along G (T tracks G), P will slide along S.
Note: According to the Wikipedia page, the point P is referred to as the "Pole", the guide line G is referred to as the "directrix", and the length CD to be reached between T and the Catch line is referred to as the "diastema".
It is possible to think of this construction (and all constructions in Euclidean geometry) in at least two different ways, namely either as assuming a physical world in which there are rigid movable objects, such as straight edges, marked rulers, compasses (or rotatable fixed-length line segments with one end fixed), or as assuming only structures and processes in a space of possible shapes and motions, which may or may not be occupied by objects with physical properties. These are examples of physical and abstract construction kits, discussed in a separate paper.
This is analogous to the difference between regarding a logical notation as concerned with physical formulae written on physical surfaces using physical coloured material, and thinking of logical notation as dealing with abstract structures and patterns that can be instantiated on physical surfaces but have properties about which we can reason without assuming any particular physical instantiation. So, for example, the formulation of the law of excluded middle in propositional calculus is not usually taken to assume that logic is concerned with ink marks on paper, or chalk marks on slate, or, for younger readers, patterns of illumination on a physical screen.
However in the logical case, besides the ambiguity between a space of physical constructions of patterns in space and abstract constructions in a space of abstract structures, there are also differences between statements about those structures themselves (e.g. which are derivable from which in the relevant construction kit) and statements about their semantic content, which in the case of propositional logic might be expressed in terms of truth tables, or more generally truth tables plus semantic rules specifying how to assign truth values to non-logical assertions (e.g. "Tom is taller than Fred").
I think some of the more obscure features of Kant's philosophy of mathematics are concerned with these distinctions between discoveries about the world and discoveries about the properties of various construction kits. Philosophers and mathematicians who reject some of Kant's claims about geometrical reasoning seem to me implicitly to accept similar claims in relation to logical reasoning. (The fact that logical rules and formulae, along with arithmetical theorems and proofs, have been given such a special status since around 1900 will probably turn out to be merely a temporary phase in the history of mathematics.)
In arithmetic based on a set of axioms and rules of inference, the status of axioms or theorems as expressing necessary truths can by undermined by considering the difference between ordinary arithmetic (Peano arithmetic) and modular arithmetic, e.g. arithmetic modulo 5. In Peano arithmetic 0 is not the successor of anything, whereas in modular arithmetic it is. Moreover in Peano arithmetic the set of numbers is infinite, whereas in arithmetic modulo 5 it is finite. Is there any reason why we should not regard modulo arithmetics and non-euclidean geometries as comparable mathematical discoveries: namely both turn out to be products constructable within certain mathematical construction kits, one spatial the other more abstract.
However the arithmetic that is based on properties of one-one correspondences comes from a different construction kit. I leave it to the reader to work out whether and how modular arithmetic can turn up in that context.
I suspect full clarity on this issue will not be possible until we have a much deeper understanding of the evolution and functions of various kinds of construction kits, including concrete, abstract and mixed construction kits.
Maintained by
Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science
The University of Birmingham
--