# ForMaRE – Publications

This is the list of publications immediately related to the ForMaRE research agenda. The ForMaRE project has supported a few other publications.

Contents: Journal articles, conference contributions (reviewed, archival), invited talks, workshop contributions (reviewed), proceedings edited, discussion papers

## Journal articles

- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions . 2015-04-30, Archive of Formal Proofs. ISSN 2150-914x
- Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Pillage games with multiple stable sets. International Journal of Game Theory, electronic version March 2015, printed version November 2015, Volume 44, Issue 4, pp 993-1013.
- Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber. Sufficient Conditions for Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games. Mathematical Social Sciences, vol 69, pp. 69 - 80, May 2014.
- Colin Rowat, Alan F. Beardon. Efficient sets are small. Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol 49(5), pp. 367 - 374, October 2013
- Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), pp. 461–466, August 2011. (accompanying Lisp code, pre-print © by Springer)

## Conference contributions (peer reviewed, archival proceedings)

- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. Sound Auction Specification and Implementation . EC'15, 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (slides by Colin Rowat at pubs/ec15-slides.pdf).
- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. Set Theory or Higher Order Logic to Represent Auction Concepts in Isabelle?. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics No. 8543 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 236–251, 2014.
- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Budget imbalance criteria for auctions: A formalized theorem (pages 35-44). 6th Podlasie Conference on Mathematics 2014.
- Christoph Lange, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Applying Mechanised Reasoning in Economics – Making Reasoners Applicable for Domain Experts. Informatik 2013 (Computer science adapted to humans, organization and the environment, 43rd annual meeting of the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI))). No. P-220 in Lecture Notes in Informatics, Köllen, pp. 153–156, 2013.
- Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber. The ForMaRE Project – Formal Mathematical Reasoning in Economics. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM, systems & projects track). No. 7961 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 330–334, 2013. (Project description and first-year summary, from a formal methods perspective)
- Christoph Lange, Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Till Mossakowski, Colin Rowat, Makarius Wenzel, Wolfgang Windsteiger. A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM, mathematical knowledge management track). No. 7961 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 200–215, 2013. (accompanying formalisations evolve in the Auction Theory Toolbox)
- Carst Tankink, Christoph Lange, Josef Urban. Point-and-write — Documenting Formal Mathematics by Reference. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM, mathematical knowledge management track). No. 7362 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 169–185, 2012.
- Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat, Wolfgang Windsteiger. Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics. Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM), 2011 (Calculemus track). No. 6824 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 58–73, 2011. (accompanying Theorema code)

## Invited Talks

- Manfred Kerber. Verifying Auctions. Research Seminar at the Department of Computer Science, University of York: CSE/082.
- Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. ForMaRE – Formal Mathematical Reasoning in Economics. 20th Automated Reasoning Workshop (ARW), 2013 (invited talk). (slides; poster) (Short project description and first-year summary, from a theorem proving perspective)
- Colin Rowat. Electricity auctions. Iraq Power, CWC, 2013 (invited talk).
- Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. An economist's guide to mechanized reasoning
*or*My computer just proved 84 impossibility theorems. Initiative for Computational Economics, 2012 (invited lecture). (Overview on the potential of applying formal methods to economics, from an economics perspective)

## Workshop and similar contributions (peer reviewed)

- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Reasoning about Dynamic Auctions (poster, slides). Automated Reasoning Workshop, Birmingham, April 2015.
- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. Reasoning about Auctions. Joint Automated Reasoning Workshop and Deduktionstreffen (ARW-DT). FLoC Workshops @ Vienna Summer of Logic, 2014.
- Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat, Wolfgang Windsteiger, Manfred Kerber. Developing an Auction Theory Toolbox. Enabling Domain Experts to use Formalised Reasoning. Do-Form, symposium at the AISB Annual Convention, 2013. (accompanying formalisations evolve in the Auction Theory Toolbox)
- Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. Formal representation and proof for cooperative games. Symposium on Mathematical Practice and Cognition at the AISB Annual Convention, 2012.

## Proceedings edited

- Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber. Enabling Domain Experts to use Formalised Reasoning (Do-Form), symposium at the AISB Annual Convention, 2013.

## Other research output

- Problem set for first order theorem provers in the TPTP format (as part of the Auction Theory Toolbox (ATT))

## Discussion papers

- Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat. Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code. arXiv, 2013. (accompanying formalisations and implementations evolve in the Auction Theory Toolbox) (First writeup on generating verified auction software)
- Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets. Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2013.
- Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Sufficient Conditions for Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games. Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2012.
- Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat. Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games. Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2009.

This page was last modified on 18 February 2016.